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STEVEN G. INGRAM*

In a Twenty-First Century "Minute"
ABSTRACT
The Rio Grande River forms a boundary between the United
States and Mexico. Under a treaty concluded in 1944, both the
United States and Mexico regulate the allocation of the Rio
Grande waters. Over the past decade, commentators have
demonstrated that the 1944 Treaty needs updating, and they have
made calls to adopt updated principles and understandings to
enhance cooperation. By developing a proactive, policy-oriented
twenty-first century Minute that makes an umbrella commitment
to modern principles of international watercourse law, the
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) can
respond to this call for modernization. The IBWC should
incorporate current, prospective-looking, and pragmatic
internationallaw principles. The U.N. Convention for the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses codifies these
principles and has already been applied in a key international
watercourse dispute, the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case. There is
a clear need to add new, pragmaticvocabulary to the 1944 Treaty.
The IBWC should use the U.N. Convention as a guide in future
interpretationsof the 1944 Treaty between the United States and
Mexico.
I. INTRODUCTION
An early principle of international law stated that a nation
exercises general and absolute sovereignty over those natural resources
within its territory.1 However, a question has perplexed lawmakers and
public policy scholars for centuries: what happens when a vital natural
resource straddles two sides of an international border? A dispute
arising over an internationally shared watercourse is formidable and will
not be resolved overnight. Nevertheless, the International Boundary and
Water Commission (IBWC), an international governmental organization
that oversees such disputes between the United States and Mexico, is in a
* Steven G. Ingram, J.D. University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law 2001,
LLM Transnational Business Practice, McGeorge School of Law 2002; B.A. University of
Michigan; Attorney with Consumer Attorneys of California, Sacramento, CA. The author
wishes to thank Prof. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Distinguished Professor at McGeorge School
of Law, for his patient encouragement and for the benefit of his insightful suggestions.
1. Harmon Doctrine, 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274 (1895).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

strategic position to facilitate the settlement of current conflicts and to
develop goals and frameworks for the settlement of future disputes. The
IBWC focuses primarily on the shared waters of the Rio Grande
straddling the United States and Mexico, specifically in the lower Rio
Grande valley of Texas.
The IBWC is in a position to become a proactive force in the
early years of the twenty-first century. Within a global context in which
borders are viewed neither as boundaries nor barriers, but instead as
permeable membranes of exchange and cooperation, the IBWC has a
strategic opportunity to provide a useful example of a tradition-bound
institution adapting to change. The IBWC's mandate covers a relatively
narrow border area, yet it includes broad duties that potentially expand
its sphere of influence in an era of heightened environmental concerns
and increased commercial contacts.
IBWC jurisdiction extends along the United States-Mexico
boundary and inland into both countries where the two nations have
constructed international projects such as dams. The IBWC is charged
with the application of the boundary and water treaties between the two
nations and settling differences that may arise in their application. The
IBWC's decisions regarding boundary disputes are subject to the
approval of the respective governments. 2 An organization representing
the interests of two nations, the IBWC is divided into a U.S. and a
Mexican section, which are overseen by the U.S. Department of State and
the Mexico Ministry of Foreign Relations, respectively. 3 An engineer acts
as commissioner of each section and the sections may appoint
engineering and legal advisors. The commissioners of the two sections
have diplomatic status. 4 The specific mission of the IBWC is to distribute
the waters of the Rio Grande and the Colorado River, in addition to
preserving the international boundaries and regulating and conserving
the waters of the rivers in the common interest of both the United States
and Mexico.5 This article proposes that the IBWC develop a policyoriented Minute (twenty-first century Minute or "Policy Minute")
utilizing modern international principles of watercourse law as
articulated in the U.N. Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses

2. International Boundary and Water Commission, available at http://www.ibwc.
state.gov/html/about-us.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
3. Harmon Doctrine, supra note 1, art. 2.
4. Treaty with Mexico Relating to the Utilization of the Waters of Certain Rivers, Feb.
3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., art. 2, 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter 1944 Treaty].
5. Id. In Mexico, the Rio Grande is named the Rio Bravo del Norte. The Rio Bravo is
fed by the Rio Conchos, which is fed in turn by five tributaries.
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of International Watercourses, 6 (Convention or U.N. Convention) as a
guide.
The IBWC records its decisions in Minutes. Minutes are recorded
in English and in Spanish, and, within three days of the date of signature, the IBWC forwards copies to each government. Unless the express
terms of the 1944 Treaty call for specific governmental approval, a
Minute becomes officially approved if there are no objections within 30
7
days.
The IBWC's critical flaw is that its functions are tied to the
outdated 1944 Treaty between the United States and Mexico. By
incorporating newly emerging principles of international law, which
recognize the importance of evaluating international watercourses in a
holistic manner, the IBWC will more effectively address "twenty-first
century-type" problems along the Rio Grande.
Times have changed and some of the provisions of the 1944
Treaty have lost their vitality. The early years of the twenty-first century
are characterized by heightened levels of economic exchange; a burst of
technological innovations based upon myriad, interconnected networks
that can be accessed simultaneously; and the commitment to find transboundary solutions to environmental concerns. New economies, new
technologies, and a shared network approach to the environment
necessitate new methods of communication and problem solving. The
1944 Treaty is outdated because it has an historically entrenched focus on
physical borders and the sovereign delimitation of a shared natural
resource. The IBWC needs to be ready to adapt and respond to this new
period of heightened international connections.
The disputes over the internationally shared waters of the Rio
Grande grow in importance each year and might soon test the thinly
stretched limits of diplomacy between the United States and Mexico.
Since the second half of the nineteenth century, it has been a matter of
concern that, as population and cultivation increase along the Rio
Grande, the danger grows that water will ultimately run out and serious
troubles will arise between the two nations. 8 The U.S. Secretary of War
expressed his alarm in 1878 to the U.S. House of Representatives over the
waters of the Rio Grande as an inadequate irrigation source. 9 Even then

6. Report of the 6th Committee, U.N. Convention on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/869 (1997) [hereinafter U.N. Convention].
7. 1944 Treaty, supra note 4, art. 25.
8. James Simsarian, The Diversion of Waters Affecting the United States and Mexico, 17
TEX. L. REV. 27, 30 n.10 (1938).
9. Id.
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the potential for Rio Grande water disputes to seriously disrupt U.S. and
Mexico relations was apparent. In 2001, commentators characterized the
Rio Grande between Texas and Mexico as a "lifeline" for both
countries. 10 However, due to water shortages, this so-called "lifeline" is
in danger of drying up for good. Indeed, in 2001 the Rio Grande stopped
1
flowing into the Gulf of Mexico for the first time in recorded history.
This article addresses the current dispute over the waters of the
Rio Grande flowing between the United States and Mexico and suggests
an approach that will facilitate efforts to solve this crisis and to prevent
future crises. Part 1I discusses the background of U.S.-Mexico Rio
Grande water relations as structured in treaties, namely the 1906 and
1944 Treaties. Part II also focuses upon the role of the IBWC as the
designated arbiter of the Rio Grande waters. Part III addresses the
current water rights debate between the United States and Mexico
concerning Mexico's failure to meet scheduled repayment of a water
debt to the United States. Part III also focuses on the challenges
confronted by the IBWC in its efforts to seek solutions to the current
problems. Next, part IV proposes the development of a new twenty-first
century Minute to the 1944 Treaty. This Minute would be dedicated to a
statement of policy that recognizes existing obligations under the 1944
Treaty while simultaneously modernizing the IBWC's problem-solving
approach, incorporating guiding principles and understandings of
modern international watercourse law. Finally, part V examines the
contribution of the U.N. Convention to the codification of modern
international principles of watercourse law and proposes that the
Convention provide a framework to energize the U.S.-Mexico water
right deliberations. Part VI concludes by stating that the IBWC should
incorporate reference principles of the Convention as a scaffold to help
integrate a twenty-first century approach into the 1944 Treaty. This new
approach would encourage lawmakers to view the Rio Grande region as
a "community of interest" rather than simply a boundary between
sovereigns.
The water shortage on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border in
2004 sets forth an early and urgent test for twenty-first century U.S.Mexico diplomacy generally and the IBWC specifically: managing scarce
natural resources in one of North America's fastest growing regions. A
10. Ross E. Milloy, A Rift over Rio Grande Water Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at
A14.
11. Id. The Rio Grande stopped flowing in February 2001. In fact, due to water
shortages, silt ridges have formed along the riverbed, creating new, informal border
crossings between the United States and Mexico. These exposed, unstable ridges have
become symbolic of the strained relationship between the two countries.
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flurry of diplomatic initiatives may yet turn the water crisis into an
exemplar of cross-border cooperation, producing a new approach to joint
long-term planning and management of the Rio Grande. 12 While fresh
water is one of the basic requirements of life and in theory there is
enough of it to meet the needs of all, in practice it is a scarce resource
with "each drop belonging to someone." 13 Significantly, a prolonged
drought in the early 1990s severely depleted available water. Politicians
and statesmen frame the discussion over water in starkly proprietary
terms. A recent diplomatic exchange emphasizes the point: U.S.
Secretary of State Colin Powell asked Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge G.
Castaneda, "Got any water for me?" To which Mr. Castaneda replied,
14
"Yeah, Colin, I always have water for you."
"The joint use of international watercourses has always
depended on the cooperation between countries along their banks,
15
regulated in some cases by international treaties and organizations."
Nevertheless, sole emphasis upon treaties viewed in isolation will
invariably result in parties viewing each other from parallel universes,
looking at a shared resource from different perspectives. 16 In times of
crisis, it is often tempting for the respective parties to discount the role of
a treaty. 17 Recent issues involving shared watercourses like the Rio
Grande demonstrate the need for an international framework that can
both inform the interpretation of existing treaties and pave the way for
the development of future agreements. 18 By incorporating the principles
12. Id.
13. Jo Jo White, Irrigation District Manager for the Rio Grande, CNN Transcripts, July
18, 2002 (stating that "every drop of water going down that river belongs to somebody, it's
been ordered by somebody whether it's a farmer, city...").
14. Ginger Thompson & Tim Weiner, Mexico Strugglesfor Attention of Pre-occupied U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, at A4.
15. MOSTAFA K. TOLBA & IWONA RUMMEL-BULSKA, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS FOR THE WORLD 1972-1973, at 47-48

(1998).
16. Alison Gregor, Mexico Aqueduct Plan Irks Farmers in Valley, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSNEWS, Nov.16, 2001, at 3B.
17. Id.
18.

STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY,

THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, NON-

NAVIGATIONAL USES 233, 246 (2001). The water resources of the Nile River Basin will be the
subject of negotiations throughout the coming years, as upper riparians begin to develop
water resources. There are potential conflicts among Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, and
Kenya. There are ongoing disputes between India and Pakistan over the shared waters of
the Indus and the Ganges rivers. Id. at 247-56. A recent dispute occurred over pollution in
the Rhine River (Rhine Salt Case Dispute) that involved Switzerland, Austria, Germany,
France, and the Netherlands (Judgment of 23 Sept. 1988, HR 13, 303 Rechtspraak, Van De
Week (1988) 150 (Neth.)). Id. at 256-60. Central Asian Republics recently concluded the
Agreement on Cooperation in the Management, Utilization and Protection of Interstate
Water Resources, 18 Feb. 1992. Id. at 263.
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that form the framework of the U.N. Convention, the IBWC could
provide a meaningful degree of flexibility to its present structure and
become a model for the solution of international water disputes.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE U.S.-MEXICO RIO GRANDE
CONTROVERSY
Recognizing the important relationship between the United
States and Mexico... whereas the United States and Mexico
share a special bi-lateral friendship... it is in keeping with
the just interests of the United States that the special nature
of the relationship between the United States and Mexico
be recognized and further cultivated to the mutual benefit
of both countries. 19
The United States and Mexico are inextricably linked by their
shared water resources. Both states have upper riparian and lower
riparian status under the IBWC template. 20 The 1944 Treaty 2l provides
for the distribution of the waters of the Colorado and the Rio Grande
rivers that form part of the international border between the United
States and Mexico. The portion of the Rio Grande downstream of El
Paso, Texas, is the focus of the current disputes between the United
States and Mexico. This section of the Rio Grande is fed by the Rio
Conchos, which flows approximately 100 miles in Mexico downstream
into the Rio Grande. Five tributaries feed the Rio Conchos: the San
Diego, San Rodrigo, Escondido, and Salado rivers and the Las Vacas
Arroyo. These rivers and tributaries ultimately feed into the Rio Grande
and the water is stored in IBWC maintained reservoirs: the Amistad
Reservoir (built in 1954 and covering 78,300 acres) and the Falcon
Reservoir (built in 1965, covering 67,000 acres). 22 In October 2003, these
reservoirs were at 34 percent capacity. 23

19. H.R. Con. Res. 206, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001).
20. Aaron Schwabach, The United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses, Customary InternationalLaw and the Interests of Developing
Upper Riparians, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 257, 263 (1998); MCCAFFREY, supra note 18, at 52. Riparian
states are, in the broad sense, states that share freshwater resources with another state.
21. 1944 Treaty, supra note 4.
22. Clint Shields, H2owe: South Texas Area Thirsty for Water from Mexico (FISCAL NOTES,
Newsletter of the Office of the Texas State Comptroller), Oct. 2003, available at Rio GRANDE
REGIONAL WATER PLANNING GROUP, http://www.riograndewaterplan.org/H2owe.php
(last visited May 14, 2004). Procedurally, Texas farmers request Rio Grande water from the
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality's (TCEQ) Watermaster, Carlos Rubenstein.
The TCEQ approves requests and forwards its authorization to the IBWC.
23. Id.
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The two nations have long disputed the terms of the water
diverted from the Rio Grande. Dialogues between the two countries
began in earnest in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 24 As
early as the 1880s, the U.S. Department of State recorded complaints
from the Governor of Texas concerning Mexican citizens digging ditches
to divert water from the Rio Grande. 25 When the U.S. Secretary of State
characterized the ditch digging as contrary to the "good feeling and
harmony that ought to exist between co-laborers in peaceful pursuits,"
26
the Mexican Minister blamed the water scarcity on the dry season.
Furthermore, he claimed that Mexicans were suffering more than
Texans, and he added that wasteful use of Rio Grande water by
Americans in Colorado and New Mexico aggravated the water
shortage. 27 Discussions between the United States and Mexico continued
for the next ten years. In 1895, U.S. Attorney General Judson Harmon
submitted an opinion addressing Mexican concerns with U.S. diversions
of Rio Grande waters. The now famous "Harmon Doctrine" stated a
principle of international law: a nation has general and absolute
sovereignty over those resources within its territory. 28 The Harmon
Doctrine, with its brittle defensive posture, was an uneasy conclusion to
the early conflict along the Rio Grande. 29
However, rather than acting on the basis of the Harmon
Doctrine, which arguably entitled the United States to the lion's share of
Rio Grande water, the United States acceded to Mexican requests to
enter into an agreement that apportioned the waters in an equitable
manner. 30 In 1896, the United States and Mexico requested that the International Boundary Commission 31 develop a solution to the Rio Grande
problem.32 The International Boundary Commission (IBC), a precursor to

24. Simsarian, supra note 8, at 27.
25. Id. at 28.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Harmon Doctrine, supra note 1.
29. In 1895, U.S. Attorney General Judson Harmon supported his doctrine with
reference to a U.S. sovereign immunity case, Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch
116, 136 (1812), that discussed how allowing Mexico to restrict U.S. diversions would in
fact be a "servitude upon the waters of the Rio Grande that would interfere with the U.S.
right to develop its resources in the interests of self-preservation." MCCAFFREY, supra note
18, at 89-91.
30. Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buried, Not
Praised,36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 549, 588 (1996).
31. The IBC had been established seven years earlier to settle border disputes resulting
from naturally shifting boundaries.
32. Simsarian, supranote 8, at 36-37.
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the IBWC, had been established in March 1889. 33 The IBC's mandate was
to settle "[aill differences or questions that may arise on... the frontier
between the United States.. .and... Mexico where the Rio Grande and the
Colorado rivers form the boundary line, whether such differences... arise
out of alterations or changes" to the natural river beds or "any other
cause affecting the boundary line[.]" 34 The IBC recommended that the
United States and Mexico enter into a treaty for the final settlement of all
35
questions regarding the distribution of the waters of the Rio Grande.
Relying on the Commission's studies, the United States and Mexico
signed their first water distribution treaty on March 1, 1906 (1906
Treaty) .36
A. The 1906 Treaty
The Preamble of the 1906 Treaty emphasized that the
distribution of the Rio Grande waters was for irrigation purposes and
that the 1906 Treaty aspired to erase all causes of controversy between
the United States and Mexico with respect to the Rio Grande. 37 Article I
of the 1906 Treaty provided for the delivery by the United States to
Mexico of 60,000 acre-feet of Rio Grande water annually. 38 Importantly,
Article II required that, in the event of extraordinary drought, the
amount of water delivered to Mexico would be diminished in the same
proportion as water delivered under the same system to the United
States. 39 The 1906 Treaty set up a precise month-by-month schedule of
delivery of water from the newly constructed Engle, New Mexico,
storage dam, totaling 60,000 acre-feet per year. 40 The 1906 Treaty stated
that any deviation from this schedule due to a major drought would
result in reduced deliveries to Mexico from the Engle Dam, but, in the

33. Id. n.33
34. Id.
35. Id. at 38.
36. Convention Between the United States and Mexico Providing for the Equitable
Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande for Irrigation Purposes, May 21, 1906, U.S.Mex., 34 Stat. 2953, available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/1906Conv.pdf [hereinafter 1906 Treaty] (last visited May 14, 2004).
37. Id. Preamble, A Proclamation. The Convention sought the equitable distribution of
the Rio Grande waters for irrigation purposes. Emphasizing "international comity," the
drafters sought to develop a feasible method of regulating the use of the waters. There was
general recognition that Mexico had been denied an equitable distribution in the past and,
consequently, the drafters emphasized the forward vision of the 1906 Treaty as a means of
addressing and moving beyond past grievances.
38. Id. art. I.
39. Id. art. II.
40. Id.
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interest of comity, the deliveries would be diminished by a percentage
no more than the corresponding reductions of water delivered to the
United States from the same dam. 41 Article V of the 1906 Treaty
encapsulated one of its foundational tenets: the 1906 Treaty would not
42
establish any general legal principle or precedent.
B. The 1944 Treaty
In 1944, the United States and Mexico expanded their shared
international watercourse regime by entering into the 1944 Treaty. 43
Specifically, the 1944 Treaty allotted Rio Grande water to the United
States and to Mexico under a schedule of water rights. 44 The terms of the
Treaty are as follows: between Fort Quitman, Texas (approximately 80
miles south of El Paso, Texas) and the Gulf of Mexico, Mexico receives
one-half of the flow of the main channel of the Rio Grande (named Rio
Bravo del Norte in Mexico). Mexico also receives two-thirds of the water
that feeds into the Rio Grande from the Rio Conchos in Mexico. 45 The Rio
Conchos is, in turn, fed by tributaries: the Rio San Diego, Rio San
Rodrigo, Rio Escondido, Rio Salado, and the Arroyo de las Vacas. The
United States, completing the Mexican allocation template, receives the
other half of the Rio Grande water below Fort Quitman and the
remaining one-third of the Rio Conchos water.46 Significantly, the U.S.
share, one-third of the Rio Conchos water, must average an amount not
less than 350,000 acre-feet annually, measured in five-year cycles.47
Currently, the allocation scheme requires the following amounts:
Mexico must deliver 350,000 acre-feet of water to the United States from
the Rio Grande annually. The United States is required to deliver 1.5
million acre-feet of water from the Colorado River to Mexico every
year.48 If Mexico, because of extraordinary drought, is deficient in its
delivery to the United States of the one-third portion, after the run of a
designated five-year cycle, it must make up any deficiency in the fiveyear cycle that immediately follows. In the event of such deficiency,

41. Id. arts. I, II.
42. Id. art. V. "The United States in entering into their treaty, does not thereby concede,
expressly or by implication, any legal basis for any claims heretofore asserted or which
may be hereafter asserted, nor does the United States in any way concede the establishment
of any general principle or precedent by the concluding of this treaty." Id.
43. 1944 Treaty, supra note 4.
44. Id. art. 4.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. art. 4 A(c), B(c).
48. Id. art. 4(B).
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Mexico would have to pay "double" for a five-year period: the debt from
the previous five-year cycle and "the allotment for the next five-year
period." 49 This assumes that any drought or other "extraordinary"
circumstance would self-correct and make up for losses in neat five-year
increments. Unfortunately, the Treaty never actually defined the term
"extraordinary." 50
C. The International Boundary Water Commission
Besides articulating a system of water rights, the 1944 Treaty had
additional significance: it extended the jurisdiction and the
responsibilities of the IBC. 51 The 1944 Treaty changed the organization's
name to the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC). The
earlier mandate of the IBC, delineated in the 1906 Treaty, had been
relatively narrow. It focused upon land ownership issues resulting from
changes in the flow of the Rio Grande. The new mandate extended the
newly created IBWC's jurisdiction to include not only the U.S.-Mexico
boundary but also areas inland in both countries where international
52
dams had been built.
Currently, the IBWC has the status of an international body. It
consists of a U.S. section and a Mexican section, each focusing upon their
respective national interests. While the commissioners have diplomatic
status, they historically have operated above all else as protectors of their
53
respective national sovereign interests.
The IBWC's formal duties reflect government priorities at the
close of World War II, which centered on water allocation rights to
international river waters, mitigation of floods, and dealing with
droughts.54 In many ways, the IBWC is a bureaucratic hybrid. 55 The
IBWC has a bipolar mandate of treaty interpretation and of operational
responsibilities for managing both the border and international dams. It
has a virtual monopoly on agreements dealing with transboundary

49. Id. (B)(d).
50. Id. art. 4.
51. Id. art. 2.
52. Id.
53. Id. art. 2.
54. Stephen P. Mumme, Managing Acute Water Scarcity on the U.S.-Mexico Border:
Institutional Issues Raised by the 1990's Drought, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 149, 155-56 (1999);
Stephen P. Mumme, Innovation and Reform in TransboundaryResource Management: A Critical
Look at the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico, 33 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 93, 94 (1993).

55. James F. Smith, Testing the Waters of Cooperation: Joint Effort to Solve a Natural
Resource CrisisMay Help Bring the U.S., Mexico Closer, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2001, at Al.
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water management. 56 From its inception, the IBWC was locked into a
scheme of "dividing the waters," an ironic system given that these
waters were understood, even in 1944, as incapable of satisfying the
U.S.-Mexico border area's demands. 57 Essentially, the IBWC's mandates
to build and to operate joint works and to resolve disputes have forced
the IBWC to operate in a reactive, ad hoc manner rather than utilizing a
proactive, systematic, and prospective approach. 58
There is a need for the IBWC to become an active integrator in
twenty-first century water dispute resolution. As a growing variety of
multilateral treaties, conventions, and agreements connect the United
States and Mexico with the global community, the static IBWC model
has become increasingly outmoded. In earlier years, this system may
have been effective. In those days, the IBWC was able to analyze and
resolve Rio Grande water disputes between the United States and
Mexico in isolation. In contrast, in the twenty-first century, the IBWC's
decisions have implications that stretch beyond the realm of isolated
water disputes. They influence the U.S. and Mexican investment commitments under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 59 the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),6 and, potentially, the
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA).61 They can also affect
treaty obligations with other nations in the international community,
including various environmental treaties such as the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna & Flora
63
(CITES)62 and the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances.
Consequently, the current U.S.-Mexican Rio Grande controversy
presents both problems and opportunities for the IBWC in the twentyfirst century.

56.

Stephen P. Mumme, Reinventing the InternationalBoundary and Water Commission, 9

BORDERLINES 1 (2001).

57. Id. at 2, 12.
58. Id. at4, 26
59. Dec. 8, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
60. Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
61. Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, Dec. 11,
1994, 34 I.L.M. 808 (1995).
62. Mar. 3, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1085 (1973).
63. Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987).
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III. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED BY THE CURRENT WATER
CRISIS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO ALONG
THE RIO GRANDE
A. The Evolution of the Current Rio Grande Water Crisis: The Early
Phase 1995-2000
In 2002, a water war between farmers on both sides of the
Rio Grande forming the border between the United States
and Mexico escalated into an international stand-off. This is
a bad omen for the future of the Rio Grande to see
international water policy result in this [situation] .64
Over the last decade, Mexico has repeatedly been unable to pay
its water debt to the United States under the allocation scheme required
by the 1944 Treaty. 65 According to the Treaty, Mexico must deliver
350,000 acre-feet of water to the United States from the Rio Grande
annually, while the United States is required to deliver 1.5 million acre66
feet of water from the Colorado River to Mexico every year. Since 1992,
Mexico has been unable to fulfill its Treaty obligations, due to extreme
67
drought.
The deficiency has affected the nations, both politically and
socially. For example, Rio Grande valley farmers in Texas have become
increasingly infuriated by Mexico's inability to deliver scheduled
allotments. 6s South Texas farmers dispute whether drought is really the
cause of the default. 69 It is equally important to note that the tension over
unmet water deliveries causes friction and ill will internally in regions
within the United States and Mexico. For example, Northern Texas
farmers are alarmed over the competition between their agricultural
needs and those of South Texas's urban centers.70 Likewise, neighboring

Mumme, supra note 54, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 149,156 (1999).
IBWC, MINUTE 307, Mar. 16, 2001, at 2; Milloy, supra note 10.
1944 Treaty, supra note 4, art. 4(B).
Milloy, supra note 10.
Melissa Sattley, Boiling Point Reservoir Wars Along the U.S.-Mexico Border, TEXAS
OBSERVER, Nov. 23, 2001, at 1.
69. Jim Yardley, Water Rights War Rages on Faltering Rio Grande, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,
2002, at A14.
70. Douglas Jehl, Saving Water, U.S. FarmersAre Worried They'll Parch, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
28, 2002, at Al.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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states within Mexico, such as Tamaulipas and Chihuahua, accuse each
other's farmers of taking more than their fair share of allocated waters. 71
In March 1995, after three years of failing to meet its Treaty
obligations, Mexico requested a "water loan" from the Rio Grande water
reserves of the United States in order to assist drought stricken farmers
in northern Mexico. The United States initially turned down the
request. 72 A U.S. official stated that shortages were severe on both sides
of the Rio Grande. 73 Then Texas Governor George W. Bush summed up
the dilemma in 1995 by pointing out that while Texas sympathized with
its Mexican neighbors, Texas's first obligation was to Texans. 74 Even
though the 1944 Treaty permits water loans when one country has an
overabundance, 75 the United States determined that it could not risk a
loan from its reserves.
Nevertheless, after months of negotiations, the United States and
Mexico reached an accord on the issue of the water loan. 76 The loan
cleared the way for Mexico to tap up to 3.5 billion cubic feet of U.S.
water. 77 By this point, Mexico had terminated agricultural irrigation for
the rest of 1995 and declared five states in northern Mexico a disaster
area. 78 While the loan was specifically described as a "line of credit for a
certain sum of water in case of emergency," Texas farmers viewed it as
an attempt by the IBWC to smooth over the rapidly accumulating
79
Mexican water debt.
In 1996, conditions continued to deteriorate and soon eclipsed
the dispute over the 1995 water loan to Mexico. As drought conditions
worsened in mid-1996, Texas cities began to initiate mandatory
conservation programs.8 0 Two Rio Grande reservoirs, the Falcon and the
Amistad, were at historic low points.81 A Texas water official observed,
"the IBWC administered water allocation system along the Rio Grande
works well as long as there is plenty of water but with a severe drought
71. Julie Watson, U.S. and Mexico in Standoff over Water, ENvTL. NEWS NETWORK, May
3, 2002, at http://www.enn.com/news/wire-stories/2002/O5/05032002/ap-47117.asp
(last visited Mar. 13, 2004).
72. Id.
73. Enrique Range, U.S. Rejects Mexico's Water Plea, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 19,
1995, at 1D.
74. Id.
75. 1944 Treaty, supra note 4, art. 9(e), art. 15 D, E, F.
76. IBWC, MINUTE 293, Oct. 4, 1995.
77. Id. at 2.
78. Wayne Slater, US Agrees to Loan Water to Drought Stricken Mexico, Pact Would Be
Used Only in Emergency, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 5, 1995, at 17A.
79. Id.
80. Dane Schiller, This Parched Land, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 14, 1996, at 7N.
81. Id. See also Shields, supra note 22.
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82
there are some people who throw the rules out of the window."
Tensions were high. Mexican farmers were observed operating illegal
pumps along the Rio Grande. Texas officials considered sending out
extra police protection on patrols that monitored the U.S. side of the Rio
83
Grande.
By early 2000, mutual empathy between the United States and
Mexico was as scarce as the water in dispute. Texas farmers requested
assistance from Governor Bush, pointing out that Mexico had accumulated a significant water debt. Governor Bush wrote to the IBWC asking
84
that the matter be resolved quickly and fairly. U.S. farmers began to
suggest that the border should be closed to incoming Mexican
agricultural crops that had been irrigated with water that should have
85
been used to pay down Mexico's water debt. Crop growers specifically
suggested that, until Mexico lived up to its part of the 1944 Treaty, the
United States should limit imports of water-intensive produce regulated
under NAFTA. 86 A newspaper editorial cited a joint report from the Rio
Grande Regional Water Planning Group and the Lower Rio Grande
Valley Economic Development Council indicating that Mexico had been
hoarding water in its reservoirs.8 7 The editorial suggested the United
88
States "lean" on Mexico to uphold their obligations under the Treaty.
Both countries produced satellite images that were used to support their
respective contentions: U.S. photos showed 89Mexicans hoarding water,
while Mexican images depicted U.S. reserves.

82. Id.
83. Placing the illegal Mexican pumping in a wider context, a Texas Natural Resource
Conservation Commissioner stated, "Mexicans risk it because it's the difference between
putting food on the table or nothing." Schiller, supra note 80. Texans and Mexicans on
opposite sides of the Rio Grande often see mirror reflections of their own plight on the
other side of the river. Id. at 8. "Many people don't realize how much South Texas is linked
to Mexico and how much Mexico is linked to South Texas. It is only a river (Rio Grande)
and the culture has always gone back and forth." Barbara Karkabi, Canvassing History,
Mural Project Explores Close Ties Between Mexico, South Texas, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 30,
2002, at 1 (comments of mural painter, painting the history of a South Texas ranch family
that had intermarried with a Mexican family).
84. Schiller, supra note 80.
85. Alison Gregor, Valley FarmersSay Mexico Owes Water, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
Feb. 18, 2000, at 10A.
86. Id.
87. Water Dispute, Mexico Needs to Fulfill Its Treaty Obligation, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Apr. 4, 2000, at 16A [hereinafter Water Dispute]. See also Lower Rio Grande Valley Water
District Managers Ass'n, Fact Sheet on Rio Grande Treaty Violations, available at www.
fernandezgroupinc.com/portfolio/mwd-factsheetl [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
88. Water Dispute, supra note 87.
89. David Rennie, Mexico and U.S. Headingfor Water War, LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH,
May 31, 2002, at 19.
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The blame laying and the finger pointing continued. The
planning group and the Rio Grande Valley's Council reported that
Mexico had received approximately 81 percent of normal rainfall
between 1993 and 1997 and had actually collected excess water. 90 The
reports were given to the U.S. Commissioner of the IBWC.91 Mexican
officials, meanwhile, contested the accuracy of the findings, arguing that,
while Mexico had received rainfall during that period, it was
exceedingly light rain that did not flow into the Rio Grande.92 As
evidence, Mexican officials pointed out the drastic measures that had
been implemented, including significantly reduced cattle herds and a
government recommendation to farmers to plant cactus crops as a means
of withstanding the drought. 93 The Mexican section of the IBWC called
the drought the second worst of the twentieth century. 94 The U.S. and
Mexican IBWC commissioners indicated that they were working
together to solve the water crises. Nevertheless, critics in the United
States were skeptical of the commissioners' efforts and took action to
seek the counsel of the U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. 95
B. The Crisis Continues to Worsen: Promises and Concerns
In March 2001, Mexico agreed to repay approximately 20 percent
of the water debt that it owed to the United States under the 1944
Treaty. 96 The agreement was characterized as a first step toward a new
90. Fact Sheet, supra note 87; Steven H. Lee & Brendan M. Case, Parched Battle: Rio
Grande Valley Drought Sparks Friction on Both Sides of Border, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar.
26, 2000, at 1H.
91. Fact Sheet, supra note 87.
92. Lee & Case, supra note 90.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. Texas Governor Rick Perry and Texas State Agricultural Commissioner Susan
Combs sent a joint letter to John Bernal, the U.S. Commissioner of the IBWC, asking him to
press for a resolution to the problem. Texas U.S. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison complained
to the Mexican Ambassador Jess Reyes Heroles, who indicated that he would relay the U.S.
concerns to Mexico City. Jo Jo White, Chairman of the Water Treaty Committee of the
Lower Rio Grande Valley Water District Managers Association, unhappy with
Commissioner Bernal's efforts, sent a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Albright
directly criticizing Mr. Bernal's "inability to adequately address" the treaty
dilemma with Mexico. This resulted in Mr. Bernal arranging a meeting
with the Valley water officials but his claim that "negotiations were
ongoing" was characterized by Mr. White, Chairman of Water Treaty
Committee of the Lower Rio Grande Valley Water District Managers
Association, as "the same old bull."
Letter from Jo Jo White, Water Treaty Committee of the Lower Rio Grande Valley Water
District Managers Ass'n, to U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright.
96. Id. (referring to IBWC, MINUTE 307, supra note 65).
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commitment by both countries to allocate and use the valuable water
97
resources of the Rio Grande in a responsible manner. Yet, as early as
July 2001, it was apparent that Mexico would not be able to meet its
98
commitment to begin repayment. The principal engineer of the U.S.
section of the IBWC, Carlos Marin, conceded that Mexico would not
99
meet the required delivery terms. The IBWC voiced its "extreme
concern" that Mexico's continued problems with recovery from drought
would prevent Mexico from meeting the recently negotiated repayment
schedule. 100 Furthermore, IBWC officials stated that they did not know
0
how to resolve the issue.' ' Exacerbating an already raw situation,
Mexican farmers in the states of Tamaulipas and Coahuila filed lawsuits
02
to stop delivery of water by Mexico to the United States. A Mexican
10 3
federal judge ruled in the farmers' favor. The mood of farmers in the
Texas Rio Grande River Valley rose from a level of frustration to anger
and then to fear over the failed efforts to enforce the 1944 Treaty.
In September 2001, the dire predictions proved to be accurate.
Mexico failed to meet the scheduled 20 percent repayment of its water
1°4
debt that it had promised in March of that year. Officials in Mexico
attributed the failure to both the drought and to local politics. Indeed, it
was becoming evident that the issue was fraught with internal political
conflict.105 Mexican President Vicente Fox supported repayment, while
local officials in northeastern Mexico were reluctant to implement the
plan. 106 Exemplifying Mexico's internal political conflict, the governor of
the Mexican state of Chihuahua announced that a pipeline was under
development to divert water from a Rio Grande tributary to northern
Mexican factories, in direct conflict with President Fox's repayment

97. Steven H. Lee, Mexico to Pay Part of Water Debt Owed to U.S., DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Mar. 20, 2001, at 1D. At the same time, reports circulated that disgruntled farmers in
northeastern Mexico were going to sue the Mexican National Water Commission for
having agreed to release the water. However, when a lawsuit did not immediately
materialize, observers noted that possibly Mexican farmers were beginning to rethink their
role, recognizing that their inefficient use of water was hurting both sides of the border.
98. Steven H. Lee, Mexico Likely to Miss Quota, Drought Blamed in Failure to Repay Water
to Valley, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 27, 2001, at 2D.
99. Id.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.

102.
103.

Sattley, supra note 68, at 3.
See also Bob Richter, Mexican Ruling on Water Debt a "Nightmare" for Valley, SAN

ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 14, 2001, at 8A.
104. Id.

105.
106.

See also Sattley, supra note 68, at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
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plan. 10 7 The governor of Chihuahua claimed that his state had already
given its share of the Mexican effort to repay the water debt. Further, he
blamed expanded farm operations due to NAFTA, in addition to the
drought, for the water scarcity.'0S The proposed Chihuahua aqueduct
became a symbol for U.S. farmers, representing Mexico's intransigence
regarding the repayment of the water debt. While Mexican officials
spoke of the aqueduct as part of a vision for the future, U.S. observers
interpreted it as a blatant sign that Mexico did not intend to adhere to its
obligations under the 1944 Treaty.1 09 The Rio Grande water crisis also
fostered competing viewpoints within the United States. In a letter to the
editor titled Share with Mexico, one concerned citizen expressed support
for Mexico's plight: "This is what I cannot understand. This water treaty
was written 57 years ago. And we still 'regulate' water to a country
much in need.. .we want to deny them the basic needs.. .White America,
wake up. It is time to share the wealth." u 0 This letter incited biting
criticism from other readers. One response read, "the letter 'Share with
Mexico' shows the writer's ignorance about the water treaty with Mexico
and
how
Mexico's
noncompliance
has
devastated
Valley
interests.... [T]he most important basic need is water...this need is being
unlawfully withheld from U.S. citizens.""'
In early 2002, while Texas farmers and politicians debated how
to respond to Mexico's failure to deliver its scheduled allotment of water,
the Mexican Foreign Relations Secretariat announced a new rationing
and recycling program along the northern Mexican border. At the same
time, the Undersecretary of Foreign Relations, Enrique Berruga, stated
that no bilateral negotiations were currently in progress to alleviate
Mexico of its water debt obligation." 2 Mr. Berruga also indicated that
Mexico was trying to have the drought declared "extreme" so as to
initiate a redistribution of water from the Rio Grande. 113 The U.S.
Ambassador to Mexico, Jeffrey Davidow, countered that Mexico's failure
to comply with the terms of the Treaty had caused serious problems in

107.

James Pinkerton, Mexico Has No Water Left to Repay Texas Farmers, HOUSTON

CHRON., Nov. 15, 2001, at 40A.

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Ples D. Walker, Share with Mexico, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 5, 2001 (letter
to the editor).
111. Jimmie Steidinger, Mexico Isn't Sharing, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Jan. 9, 2002
(letter to the editor).
112. Mexico to Repay Water Debt to U.S., THE NEWS (Mexico), Feb 26, 2002.
113. U.S. Ambassador: Mexico Has Not Fulfilled Obligations Under Water Treaty, EL
UNIVERSAL (Mexico), Apr. 15, 2002.
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11 4
the United States. Water woes were whipping up a war of words.
While tensions rose, the IBWC became increasingly bound to its narrow
focus on allocation schedules and progressively more removed from the
everyday plight of farmers along the Rio Grande.
As mentioned previously, the IBWC has the mandate, under
Rio
articles II and III of the 1944 Treaty, to settle water disputes along the
to
IBWC
the
for
Grande. Article III provides an express list of priorities
the
of
follow when providing for the joint use of the international waters
Rio Grande: domestic, agricultural, electrical, industrial, navigational,
116
the
and recreational use. In addition, Articles IV through XXV require
to
and
Grande
Rio
the
along
works
maintain
IBWC to construct and
the
out
carry
to
necessary
schedules
deliver water according to specific
7
terms of the Treaty.11 In order to carry out these mandates, the IBWC
must necessarily rely upon its scientific and engineering expertise.
Nevertheless, the IBWC is simultaneously charged with applying the
terms of the Treaty; exercising the rights and obligations of the United
States and Mexico; settling disputes; and producing reports, studies, and
8
opinions to the two governments)' This mandate provides the IBWC
with the opportunity to develop updated policy arguments and to
interpret Treaty language taking into consideration new theories and
lines of legal reasoning. Consequently, the 1944 Treaty contains a policy
dimension as well as a technical, empirical dimension.
Yet, throughout the 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first
century, the IBWC issued Minutes that were technical documents,
focusing on allocation formulae, moving due dates, and changing
scheduled amounts due in an attempt to set the overall "balance sheet"
right.1 9 The IBWC is a key participant in the current dilemma and, yet,
in the midst of the barrage of accusations and counter-accusations, it
seems to have been relegated to a distant role of number crunching.
Placing primary focus upon allocation schemes and moving due dates
and adjustments of amounts due are inadequate measures to address
individual farmers' plights in periods of prolonged drought. In
agricultural fields on both sides of the Rio Grande, the abstract focus on

114. Id.
Apr. 16,
115. Conrad Fox, Water Woes Whipping Up War of Words, THE NEWS (Mexico),
2002.
116. 1944 Treaty, supra note 4, art. 3.
117. Id. arts. 4-25.
118. Id. arts. 4, 6, 7, 8, 13, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25.
MINUTE
119. IBWC, MINUTE 293, Oct. 4, 1995; lBWC, MINUTE 299, Dec. 3, 1998; IBWC,
IBWC
2000;
26,
Oct.
304,
Minute
IBWC,
2000;
12,
Dec.
306,
Minute
304, Oct. 26, 2000; IBWC,
308, June 28,
MINUTE 306, Dec. 12, 2000; IBWC MINUTE 307, Mar. 16, 2001; IBWC MINUTE
2002; IBWC MINUTE 309, July 3, 2003.
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schedules and numbers seem detached from the day-to-day
consequences resulting from water scarcity. An anecdote illustrates the
point: In early 2001 a Texas farmer looked across the Rio Grande and
watched as a Mexican farmer illegally pumped water from the river. The
Texas farmer was at once both infuriated and sympathetic. Yet, the
Texan could easily imagine that he would do the same if it were a matter
of survival. 20 The IBWC must adopt new, flexible language in its
Minutes, language that includes a policy dimension responding to the
current highly interconnected Rio Grande border region and to the
individuals aligned on either side of this international watercourse.
C. The IBWC's Role in Water Dispute Resolution in the Twenty-First
Century
The literature on the IBWC's United States Section suggests
that the Agency has historically been an insular
organization that has not been open to public participation .... What we need at this time is an organization that
anticipates problems, develops social expertise, and that
[accents] an open and participatory process. 121
Key scholars have recently criticized the IBWC. 122 A common
criticism is that the two sections of the IBWC are pitted against one
another. Because the Mexican and American commissioners defend their
respective interests, the division sets up an adversarial relationship.
Consequently, deliberations often result in each side rigidly protecting
their own nation's interests. The IBWC has therefore survived by
capitalizing on its weaknesses: it has transformed its narrow range of
jurisdiction, the border region, through its tight focus upon water
delivery schedules, into an institutional strength.123 As a result, the IBWC
has cultivated staunch supporters on both sides of the border. The IBWC
has built up its reputation as an authoritative forum for dispute
resolution in the Rio Grande border region by developing close ties to
the elite tier of water managers and defending the core values of its

120. Steven H. Lee, Streams of Contentiousness;Border Drought Tests Complex System for
Defending Texans' Water Rights, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 2,1995, at 1A.
121. Helen Ingram & David R. White, International Boundary and Water Commission:An
Institutional Mismatchfor Resolving TransboundaryWater Problems, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 153,
169, 174 (1993).
122. Id.; Mumme, supra note 54,33 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 93, at 100.
123. Ingram & White, supra note 121; Mumme, supra note 54, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 93,
at 100.
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24
constituents in both countries. Yet, while the narrow, physical limits of
its jurisdiction have not changed, the social dynamics within that
jurisdiction are rapidly expanding. Increased population, new
technologies, and heightened commercial exchange now challenge the
IBWC to expand its thinking and to develop integrative patterns of
decision making.
It is time for the IBWC to change. The parallel national tracks of
the U.S. and Mexico IBWC sections, designed in 1944 to act as a "check
and balance" and to preserve national sovereignty, are not adequate to
125
The 1944 Treaty is an outdated
solve twenty-first century problems.
formula in desperate need of an adjustment: the addition of a new
policy-oriented factor. Recurring drought, coupled with changing social
forces, puts enormous stress on the dispute resolution system. The
binational management regime is currently undergoing the most serious
pressure for transformation since the present treaty-based regime was
consolidated in 1944.
This pressure for transformation is a product of two basic trends:
(1) urbanization and industrialization and (2) the accelerating pace of
127
126 American companies invest in maquiladoras,
economic integration.
Mexican workers cross the border and have become a key component of
the U.S. labor force, and commercial truck traffic carries a wide variety of
goods across the border. The IBWC should function like a secure
international shoelace connecting and tying together communities of
interest on both sides of the Rio Grande.
A river that serves as a shared natural resource and a border has
a physical dimension that suggests permanence; nevertheless, as
populations along both sides of the border increase, agricultural and
manufacturing practices advance, and transboundary commercial
contacts multiply, that same river must be viewed in its dynamic context.
As noted earlier, the IBWC is an international body, its commissioners
have diplomatic status, and they answer respectively to the State
Department in the United States and to the Foreign Ministry in Mexico.
Yet, the IBWC has traditionally deferred to local authorities and to

124.

Stephen P. Mumme, New Challengesfor US-Mexico Water Resources Management, in

THE PEACEFUL MANAGEMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES 261 (Gerald H. Blake et al.

eds., Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y Series, 1995).
125. Ingram & White, supranote 121, at 174.
126. Mumme, supra note 124, at 261.
127. A maquiladora is "an assembly plant in Mexico, especially one found along the
border between the United States and Mexico, to which foreign materials and parts are
shipped and from which the finished product is returned to the original market."
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1097 (3rd ed. 1992).
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domestic agencies for regulatory and enforcement matters.128 The IBWC
has historically played down its authority to independently influence
public policy. The IBWC is vested with jurisdiction over the shared Rio
Grande border region. 129 Its decisions are subject only to the review of
the Department of State in the United States and the Ministry of Foreign
Relations in Mexico. 130 When water allocation problems predominated in
the 1940s-1960s, the original template, with each section defending their
sovereign interests, worked satisfactorily. Once amounts of water were
distributed, the IBWC would leave the day-to-day regulation to local
authorities. 131 However, the 1970s began to usher in environmental
concerns (such as water quality and pollution) that did not respond well
to emphasis upon territorial limits. The IBWC began to adjust to the
changed circumstances in an ad hoc fashion, issuing Minutes that
addressed problems on a case-by-case basis. 132 The border region has
undergone significant change since 1944; it is now necessary to start
rethinking the structure of the IBWC. 133
New technologies enabling high-speed economic exchange and
communication and modern network approaches to regional governance
characterize twenty-first century transnational relations. International
actors like the IBWC must emphasize and implement overarching
policies reflecting these new circumstances. There needs to be a rearticulation of the international dimension of the IBWC and an assertion
of a new international framework that more actively implements modern
cooperative policies. Any forfeiture of this opportunity to revitalize the
IBWC probably will ensure that the 1944 Treaty will increasingly stifle
optimal solutions to water allocation problems along the Rio Grande.

128. Mumme, supra note 54, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 93, at 96.
129. 1944 Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 2, 8, 24(b), (c), (d) (referring to jurisdiction
of the
IBWC specifying physical land, river boundaries, and all constructions built
to carry out
provisions of the 1944 Treaty).
Jurisdiction of the Commission covers all powers and duties entrusted to
the IBWC by the 1944 Treaty and other treaties in force between the
United States and Mexico, and to carry into execution and prevent the
violation of the provisions of those treaties and agreements. The
authorities of each country shall aid and support the exercise and
discharge of these powers and duties.. .and the Commissioners shall
invoke when necessary the jurisdiction of the courts or other appropriate
agencies of his country to aid in the execution and enforcement of these
powers and duties.
Id. art. 24(c), (d).
130. Id. arts. 2, 6, 8, 18, 20, 23, 24, 25.
131. Mumme, supra note 124, at 296.
132. Id. at 265-67.
133. Id. at 265.
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The effectiveness of the 1944 Treaty has been repeatedly
questioned; it suffers heightened criticism with each drought and with
each water delivery deadline that goes unmet. In Texas, farmers have
voiced support for scrapping the Treaty altogether.134 This sentiment has
been fueled by proposed plans to actually divert water so that it never
reaches Mexico. 135 However, at the same time that Texas officials refer to
136
a growing number of Texans,
the Treaty as a "toothless wonder,"
the
including agricultural producers, are beginning to question whether
137
guide.
best
the
be
to
continues
longstanding Texas "rule of capture"
Criticism and questioning of the Treaty is not confined to Texas.
Adding to the complexity of the matter are various interpretations of the
Treaty and opinions about its vitality by farmers and officials in
Mexico. 138 Mexican farmers in the State of Chihuahua claim that the
139
Mexican President Fox has himself
Treaty is outdated and unfair.
called for an overhaul of the "old Treaty" because it never contemplated
the explosive growth of population and industry and because of
140
It is true that the area has
increasing evidence of climatic change.
undergone extreme change. The population in the U.S.-Mexico border
area has increased 400 percent since 1945 and has shifted from an
agricultural employment base to an urban and industrialized
million people live in 'sister cities 'along the
economy. 141 "Currently, 6.9
142
boundary."
international

134. Steve Taylor, Farm Bureau Set to Kill Water Treaty If Valley Farmers Approve,
McALLEN MONITOR, June 4, 2002.
Take
135. Chuck Lindell, Texans: U.S. Being Too Soft on Mexico, State Department Must
Oct. 3, 2002,
STATESMAN,
AM.
AUSTIN
Say,
Some
Debt,
Water
Its
Pay
to
Country
Get
to
Action
2002
at B1. For example, an Irrigation District's General Manager proposed a plan in May
of the
water
from
water
Mexico-bound
divert
to
pipeline
flow
gravity
400-mile
a
build
to
Colorado River flowing into the Rio Grande in Texas.
136. Id.
14 NAT.
137. John R. Pitts & Janet L. Hamilton, Texas Water Law for the New Millennium,
RESOURCES & ENV'T 35, 39 (1999).
The rule of capture, also known as.. .the absolute ownership rule, allows a
landowner to withdraw as much water as necessary from beneath the
owner's land so long as the water is put to a beneficial use. The landowner
is not liable to an adjacent landowner for harm to a neighbor's well except
in limited circumstances.
Id.
Officials
138. Brenda Rodriguez, Water Dispute: A Dry Hate; Drought-Weary Farmers, U.S.
1A.
Say Mexico Hoarding Supply, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 25, 2002, at

139.
140.

Watson, supra note 71 (stating that the farmers call it "an old Treaty").
Ricardo Sandoval, Despite Deal Water Fight Flows, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 11,

2003, at 33A.

141. Patricia A. Jones, U.S. Mexico Boundary Waters Treaty and North American
Environmental Agreements: Mhat Lessons for International Water Agreements' Compliance
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Yet, despite this vigorous criticism from both sides of the Rio
Grande, the solution to what ails the 1944 Treaty should come from
within its existing structure. Scholars believe that amending the 1944
Treaty would be very difficult and that substantive changes in the rules
would face a long deliberative process by both the U.S and Mexican
governments. 143 Recently a scholar noted,
Treaties, however, are political documents that reflect the
diplomatic possibilities of the past as reinforced by the
cumulative record of institutional practices in their service,
and, as such, are often difficult to change... [and] it is highly
unlikely that the present binding treaties.. .will be reopened
for revision given the enormity of the political stakes
involved."'144
A January 2003 Report on Rio Grande transboundary water
management emphasized a fundamental tenet of treaty law: the parties
must in good faith respect their obligations arising under existing
treaties. 145 What's more, "disputes concerning [the] treaty should be
settled in conformity with the treaty's terms and with principles of
international law." 146 Through the reinterpretation of treaty provisions,
the readjustment of current institutional practices, or other international
mechanisms that do not impair treaty based commitments, 147 a degree of
flexibility can be added to the existing Treaty that accents its
international dimension.

Mechanisms?, University of Dundee Draft Working Paper. Jones points out that the border
population has grown from 1,055,798 in 1945 to a current 4,162,210. Id. at 2.
142. Id.
143. Mumme, supra note 54, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 93, at 101.
144. Mumme, supra note 54, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 149, at 156.
145. CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES ET AL., U.S.-MEXICO TRANSBOUNDARY WATER
MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF THE Rio GRANDE/ RIO BRAvO, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY
MAKERS FOR THE MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM. Report of the U.S.-Mex. Binational Council

(Jan. 2003) [hereinafter Binational Council Report]. The fundamental tenet is pacta sunt
servanda, stated in the Vienna Convention on the Law- of Treaties, May-,3,.969, art. 26, 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969). Pacta sunt servanda states that a party to a treaty has the obligation to
apply the terms of the treaty in good faith.
146. Id.
147. Mumme, supranote 54, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 149, at 156.
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IV. THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY THE CURRENT WATER
CRISIS ALONG THE RIO GRANDE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY MINUTE STATING A COMMITMENT
TO MODERN PRINCIPLES AND UNDERSTANDINGS OF
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSE LAW
A. Working with the Language of the 1944 Treaty
As a threshold matter, the 1944 Treaty's language must be
aligned and brought into congruence with current canons of customary
international watercourse law. 1 48 While the Treaty is a political document
reflecting the diplomatic possibilities of the past and will be difficult to
150
change, 149 it can nevertheless be strengthened. Its survival over the last
151
by
half century is evidence of a certain level of public support;
its
articles,
Treaty's
the
in
expanding the language of implementation
twentyadaptable,
effective,
for
reputation could grow as an exemplar
first century transboundary water resource management. Radical reform
is not necessary to achieve this goal. Rather, it may be as simple as
adding text to the Treaty's existing language to describe support for
modern internationally recognized principles. These principles would
then serve as guideposts for 5 2the solution of twenty-first century
problems along the Rio Grande.'
Using the original provisions of the Treaty, the IBWC could
develop and extend the Commission's truly international obligations and
practice. 153 In particular, articles 2, 24, and 25 of the Treaty allow the
IBWC, with the concurrence of the U.S. and Mexican governments, to
interpret the Treaty and to apply or to extend its provisions in order to
deal with specific problems. 154 For example, there are critical exceptions

148. Alberto Szekely, Emerging Boundary Environmental Challenges and Institutional Issues:
Mexico and the United States, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J.33, 38 (1993).
149. Mumme, supra note 54, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 149, at 156
150. Mumme, supra note 124, at 272.
151. Id. at 156.
152. Alberto Szekely, How to Accommodate an Uncertain Future into Institutional
Responsiveness and Planning: The Case of Mexico and the United States, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J.
397,401 (1993).
153. Mumme, supra note 54, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 149, at 161.
154. 1944 Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 2, 24(d), 25. Article 2 states that the IBWC shall be
entrusted to apply the Treaty toward "the settlement of all disputes." Article 24(d) states
settle all differences that may arise
that the IBWC shall have the power and duty "[tlo
between the two governments with respect to the interpretation or application of this
Treaty, subject to the approval of the two Governments." Article 25 states, "Unless one of
the two governments objects to the terms of an IBWC opinion [Minute] within 30 days after
it has been issued, the Opinion shall be considered to be approved by the governments."
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in the 1944 Treaty that pertain to "extraordinary drought" scenarios.1 55
Regrettably, the Treaty fails to define the term "extraordinary drought"
and neglects to address other modem concerns such as the effects of
56
climatic change1
The IBWC has relied upon the language of the Treaty to justify
exercises of discretion in rendering its decisions. Confronting an ongoing
dispute involving the Colorado River, the IBWC used Article 25 to justify
their decision and to add regulations. 5 7 The IBWC responded to a
problem where the drafters of the Treaty originally had allocated only
approximately ten percent of the Colorado River flow to Mexico but also
"contemplated and authorized" expanded notions of water
use in article
3.158 In 1973, Mexico responded to a 1960s practice of the U.S. section that
involved draining saline ground water into the Colorado River as it
flowed through Arizona and then deducting this quantity of saline water
from Mexico's allotted share of fresh water.1 59 Mexico, in reaction,
"began a 'crash program' of groundwater development in the border
region, to make up for the losses." 160 Addressing the ongoing crisis, the
IBWC, after a prolonged period of negotiations, used the Treaty's
permissive language in article 25 as justification to add regulations and
to define procedures in the form of a Minute. 161 The IBWC limited
groundwater withdrawals on both sides of the border and required
future consultations regarding groundwater development in the border
162
region.
More recently, the IBWC exercised similar discretion. For
example, in Minutes 307 and 308, the IBWC issued a call to adopt
principles and understandings enabling both the United States and
155. 1944 Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 4, 9(f), 15 Schedule II(D) (in "years of limited
supply"). See also Mumme, supra note 54, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 149, at 154.
156. 1944 Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 4, 9(f), 15 Schedule II(D). See also Mumme, supra note
54, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 149, at 150-51. The Treaty, however, does have language that
allows the IBWC flexibility to add new staff members to consider these and other issues
and make recommendations.
157. IBWC, MINUTE 242, Aug. 30, 1973 (seeking a "permanent and definitive solution of
the international problem of the salinity of the Colorado River").
158. William J. Snape III, Adding an Environmental Minute to the 1944 Water Treaty:
Impossible or Inevitable? Appendix D in Workshop Proceedings, Water and Environmental
Issues of the Colorado River Border Region Roundtable Workshop, San Luis Rio Colorado,
Sonora, Mexico, Apr. 30, 1988, available at http://www.sci.sdsu.edu/salton/Snape998
EnvironMinute.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
159. Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, U.S/Mexico Shared Aquifers (Oct.
2002), at http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/projects/casestudies/us-mexico.ht
ml (last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
160. Id.
161. IBWC, MINUTE 242, supra note 157.
162. Id.
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Mexico to give highest priority to fulfilling their respective 1944 Treaty
obligations. 163 In Minutes 307 and 308, the IBWC sought enhanced
cooperation in the areas of drought management and sustainable
development by stating the need for an ongoing dialogue between the
two countries, the need for the development of a "framework" to
address future drought related emergencies (Minute 307), and the need
for increased data exchange and the adoption of "principles and
understandings" (Minute 308).164
B. Article 25 and the Role of the Minute
Article 25 of the 1944 Treaty calls for the IBWC to develop rules
165
and to issue decisions in the form of Minutes. Minutes become binding
unless one of the Parties objects to the substance of the proposed Minute
within 30 days.166 In 1995, Minute 293 provided emergency relief to
Mexico during a particularly severe drought by allowing Mexico to use
water from the Rio Conchos in Mexico that was scheduled for delivery to
the United States and requiring Mexico to later repay the amount of
167
In March 2001, Minute 307
water diverted to its emergency use).
established a partial repayment schedule for Mexico's existing water
debt. 68 In June 2002, the United States and Mexico, in Minute 308, made
another attempt to address the continuing and growing Mexican water
170
debt.169 Minute 308 also noted the need for a new plan. It called for the
convening of a bi-national summit on sustainable water management
of
and for the development of a forum to facilitate the exchange
171
information between the IBWC commissioners in both countries.
The recent use of Minutes makes clear the need for stronger
policy positions. Minute 308, for example, only left open the prospect for
163. IBWC, MINUTE 308 D, supra note 119.
164. Id. art. G (referring to IBWC, MINUTE 307, supra note 65).
165. 1944 Treaty, supra note 4, art. 25. "Decisions of the Commission shall be recorded in
the form of Minutes done in duplicate in the English and Spanish languages, signed by
each Commissioner and attested by the Secretaries." Id.
166. Id.
167. IBWC, MINUTE 293, supra note 76. Unfortunately, the structure of this Minute still
focused on allocative formulas.
168. IBWC, MINUTE 307, supra note 65.
169. IBWC, MINUTE 308, supra note 119 (entrenching the focus on the numbers and the
deficit).
170. Id.
171. Id. (seeking to implement MINUTE 307, supra note 65, Recommendation No. 3). Mexico
and the United States plan to form a Basin Congress, Consejo de Cuenca, to provide input to
the planning process for the Rio Grande Basin. Instituto Mexicano de Tecnologia de Agua
(IMTA) (Mexican Water Technology Institute) is working on a management plan for the
Mexican portion of the Rio Grande.
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further negotiation while vaguely referring to the need for new
"principles and understandings." 172 The time is ripe to add a new
Policy
Minute to respond to this call for principles and understandings.
Although general policy language of cooperation is sometimes laced
between the water account statements and repayment schedules of
recent Minutes, the IBWC needs to make a more emphatic commitment
to an activist policy of cooperation built upon a foundation of mutually
recognized international principles and understandings. 73
Despite the tension, the border regions of the United States and
Mexico have shared interests and would benefit greatly from increased
cooperation. The United States and Mexico can see reflections of their
own individual concerns in each other's plights. Government officials
and farmers in Texas and in Mexico speak in terms of a shared destiny.
Texas Governor Perry has stated, "Mexico and Texas are always going to
be neighbors, and we're always going to have issues that unite us... [a]nd
that's where I try to focus." 174 Texas farmers see something other than a
line of division in the Rio Grande. As one pointed out, "That river is not
a dividing line, it is just a geographic feature because people on both
sides depend upon each other to make a living." 175
A plan is in the works "to bring the governors of New Mexico,
Texas and the Mexican States of Chihuahua, Coahuila and Tamaulipas
together to draft a water agreement to help future generations on both
sides of the border manage the basin." 176 This call for action at the state
level exemplifies the impatience with the absence of a clear resolution to
the ongoing water crises along the U.S.-Mexico border region. 177 In
172. IBWC, MINUTE 307, supra note 65, art. D.
173. Id. at 3 (calling for both nations to "identify measures of cooperation on drought
management and sustainable management of this basin").
174. Dudley Althaus, Perry in Mexico Defends Execution; Says Death of Suarez Not Racist,
HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 24, 2002, at B1.
175. Jim Yardley, A River That United Lives Is Now a Barrier,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2002, at
Al.
176. Leslie Hoffman, Governors to Unite on Rio Grande Issues, FT. WORTH STAR-TEL., Dec.
30, 2003, at 5.
177. Id.
"I'm very concerned by the lack of attention Mexico's federal government
and the U.S. government are giving to water issues at the border," said
New Mexico Governor, Bill Richardson, who is behind the effort calling
for the inter-state conference. Richardson wants the governors to draft an
agreement that would cover: water use, water conservation and river
management. He hopes to rally the leaders using his influence as
Chairman of the U.S.-Mexico Border Governors' Conference. An
Agreement could be a breakthrough for the border. The Utton
Transboundary Research Center is drafting a comprehensive briefing
report on the basin's water issues for the governors to review. Alberto
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Mexico, farmers near the border have petitioned Mexican President Fox
to resolve the debt. 178 Mexicans recognize that their relationship with the
United States is a key relationship that needs to be both broadened and
180
strengthened. 179 As with other water wars, this one has human origins.
It is heartening to see, at both official and grass roots levels, a mutual
recognition of the need for new solutions.
A Policy Minute dedicated to a clear overarching policy
statement would make an important contribution to these calls to action.
It would utilize modern and internationally recognized principles as a
reference for water allocation dispute resolution. This would also add
structure to the groundswell of calls for change to the 1944 Treaty. The
Treaty needs to evolve and respond to changed conditions, just as
international water law evolves when perceptions of the value of
international rivers change. To allow the 1944 Treaty to remain hostage
to a solitary regime of debit/credit statements is to relegate the Treaty to
the role of an obstacle instead of affirming its role as a facilitator.
A Policy Minute of international principles and understandings
would not eliminate the role of specific water allocation entitlements.
Firm entitlements are an essential element of any allocation regime but
18
they mask the inevitable uncertainty of such regimes. ' Instead, a Policy
Minute would articulate a plan to make allowances through a "temporal
risk factor" for any changed conditions, emphasizing percentages of flow
rather than fixed quantities. 8 2 The Policy Minute would downplay the

Szekely, Gov. Richardson's counterpart in Mexico says: "The most critical
issue is that we don't have a law of the river. Water has been given on the
basis of concessions instead of water law. The IBWC has a limited
mandate." Sally Spener, spokeswoman for the U.S. Section of the IBWC
argues that the IBWC is increasingly taking a more proactive role on water
management, especially given the drought.
Id.
178. Tim Weiner, Water Crisis Grows Into a Test of U.S.-Mexico Relations, N.Y. TIMES, May
24, 2000, at A3 (statement of Juan Luis Zapata, Mexican sorghum farmer wearing a New
York Yankees cap).
179. Tim Weiner, Mexican Foreign Minister Quits; Critic of NAFTA Replaces Him, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at A3; The Senate of Texas, Subcommittee Works to Address Dry Times in
Texas, TEX. SENATE NEWS, Nov. 14, 2002 (referring to the fact that Texas Attorney General
John Cornyn sets up Rio Grande Water Rights Task Force).
180. Hugh Dellios, Sharing the Rio Grande, CHICAGO TRIB., July 7, 2002, at C1 (quoting
Alvaro Rivera Fernandez, head of farmers union in Tamaulipas. Also adding that "[bloth
sides made clear that the issue of water debt defies rapid solutions and (is) likely to remain
problematic for years."); Richard Boudreaux, Mexico U.S. Agree to Be Patient in Talks, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 2002, at 1; Patty Reinert, Bush, Fox Spell Out Plan for Prosperity, HOUSTON
CHRON., Mar. 23, 2002, at 1.
181. Id.
182. The author thanks Prof. Stephen C. McCaffrey for this observation.
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enforcement of an entitlement and instead evaluate deficits within an
historical context of changed demographics, environmental conditions,
and commercial interdependence.18 3 Modifying the 1944 Treaty with the
addition of a Policy Minute is preferable to an attempt to totally overhaul
the Treaty. Working within the existing structure of the Treaty provides
a sense of continuity and, at the same time, demonstrates that it can
effectively adapt to the new circumstances of a highly interconnected
region of shared responsibilities.1 84
C. The Need for a New Twenty-First Century Minute
The early years of the twenty-first century provide a strategic
opportunity to revitalize the 1944 Treaty. The addition of a Policy Minute
will move attention of watercourse managers away from the national
sovereignty emphasis by the U.S. and Mexico sections during the last
century. With a focus upon pragmatic policy, the new Policy Minute
should emphasize the following.
1. Shared responsibilities:Drawing renewed emphasis to the Rio
Grande border area as an entire network, a system that provides
flexibility among the participating states to shoulder extra individual
responsibilities in times of crisis 185 It is vital to move away from "zero
sum analysis," which inherently results in nation-to-nation comparisons
rather than a more holistic evaluation. 186 The Rio Grande watercourse
regime is an international network, a system of contacts and connections
at many different levels. A network approach can provide a new way of
thinking about familiar problems. 187
The first focus of a Policy Minute, shared responsibilities, sets
out a new overarching theme for the future application of the Treaty.
After all, policymakers have much to learn from the trials and errors and
successes and failures of the last 60 years under the 1944 Treaty. Recent
droughts have created unprecedented degrees of water stress and have
183. Id.
184. Robert E. Goodin, InternationalEthics and the Environmental Crisis, 4 ETHICS & INT'L
AFF. 91, 104 (1990). See also Mumme supra note 54, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 149, at 156-57.
185. Mumme, supra note 54, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 149, at 156-57.
186. A "zero-sum game" is one in which any gain by one party entails a corresponding
loss by the other. "Zero-sum" in this context refers to fixed allocations of water, where
every drop of water is characterized as belonging to some party by terms of a fixed
formula, i.e., a formula without flexibility. Zero-sum would require every past deficit to be
paid in full without extenuating considerations before the parties could move on in any
future negotiations. See also supra note 179.
187. Duncan J. Watts, Unraveling the Mysteries of the Connected Age, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., Feb. 14, 2003, at B7.
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led to more and more "zero-sum" situations. 188 A new policy-oriented
Minute establishing a commitment to modem international watercourse
law principles could state a pragmatic policy of shared responsibilities to
contribute to the optimal management of one extended Rio Grande
network. Within this network, acts and their consequences are not
isolated in their effect. They do not just affect a balance sheet of static
water allotments but must be reconciled with the total system. The
international Rio Grande regime operating under twenty-first century
principles would shift analysis away from "zero-sum" games toward
upon the
benefits. The emphasis
maximizing system-wide
interconnectedness of the U.S.-Mexico border region would facilitate the
development of long-range plans for the region.
2. Long-term strategies: Planning that develops intergenerational timelines that take into consideration the protracted well-being of
the water supply and the environment, as well as commercial needs.
Additionally, a twenty-first century Minute could commit to proactive
educational projects in the United States and Mexico.
Secondly, a focus upon long-term strategies is key for a new
Policy Minute. A recent binational study suggested that adding a Minute
dedicated to long-term strategies would help to clarify treaty definitions
and concepts.189 While there will always be pressures to prioritize
190
"immediate" domestic concerns over international treaty obligations, a
Minute of pragmatic long-term policy would prove to be a refuge where
conflicting voices could gather to place localized crises into a long-term,
system-wide perspective. The same arguments supporting a new longterm Policy Minute have relevance to arguments supporting the addition
of an ecological Minute that would make the Treaty more compatible
with contemporary domestic and international law governing the
protection of endangered species.191 Professor Mumme's persuasive
argument for an ecological Minute points to expected controversies that
192
would likely surround any conceptual expansion of the 1944 Treaty.
William J. Snape III, Legal Director of Defenders of Wildlife, argues that
188.

Sandra L. Postel & Aaron T.Wolf, Dehydrating Conflict; Possible Wars over Water, 126

FOREIGN POL'Y 60 (2001).

Binational Council Report, supra note 145, at 6.
Id. at5.
191. Stephen P. Mumme, Water Use Symposium: The Casefor Adding an Ecology Minute
to United States-Mexico Water Treaty, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 239, 249 (2002). Mexican scholars
also support making the Treaty language more definitive. See Szekely, supra note 148; see
also Roberto Sanchez, Public Participationand the IBWC: Challenges and Options, 33 NAT.
189.

190.

RESOURCESJ. 283, 284 (1993).

192.

Mumme, supra note 191, at 255, 256.
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it is inevitable that an "environmental minute" will be added to the 1944
Treaty. For support he refers to accepted notions of international law
that push for this new comprehensive ecologically oriented Minute and
to article 17 of the 1944 Treaty that incorporates the well-recognized Trail
Smelter principle. 93 By looking to established international law
principles, as well as to emerging principles, a long-term strategy will
revitalize the Treaty.
3. Heightened applicationof internationallegal principles and norms:
This has been exemplified in recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions. 94 For
example, the principle of contemporaneity (the need to continually
assess and to update existing treaties and agreements in light of new
norms and standards) could provide a built-in adjustment factor to
respond to changed conditions, such as extraordinary drought.
Third, by identifying important new principles of international
law in addition to emphasizing well-settled international principles, a
Policy Minute would provide implementation language for developing
the long-term strategies that would inject new flexibility into the Treaty.
A recent trend in U.S. courts to cite to and to discuss international
conventions and international legal norms provides some evidence of a
heightened recognition in the United States of certain global concerns. 195
193. Snape, supra note 158, at 3. The Trail Smelter principle states a fundamental
principle of international law: a sovereign state is supreme within its own territorial
domain; the state and its nationals are entitled to use and enjoy their territory and property
without interference from an outside source. United States v. Canada, 1941, 2 UNRIAA
1905 (1949). Article 17 of the 1944 Treaty states,
Each government agrees to furnish the other Government, as far in
advance as practicable, any information it may have in regard to such
extraordinary discharges of water from reservoirs and flood flows on its
own territory as may produce floods on the territory of the other. Each
Government declares its intention to operate its storage dams in such
manner, consistent with the normal operations of its hydraulic systems, as
to avoid, as far as feasible, material damage in the territory of the other.
1944 Treaty, supra note 4, art. 17.
194. In the recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling on affirmative action at the University of
Michigan Law School, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer referred specifically to international
law. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2445 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennedy made specific reference to the European Court of Human Rights in his majority
opinion rejecting Texas anti-sodomy law, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003).
195. In Gratz, Justice Ginsburg stated, "Contemporary human rights documents draw a
line that in some instances may allow 'racial classifications' where they are not invidious in
implication but advanced to 'correct inequalities.' These contemporary documents
distinguish between policies of oppression and measures designed to accelerate de facto
equality" (citing the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination and U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women). In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy stated,
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By incorporating references to evolving international norms, the IBWC
will enhance the relevance of the Treaty and provide it with the potential
to transform the IBWC Rio Grande regime into a useful model for other6
19
nations in the international community that share watercourses.
Failure to inject new vitality into the Treaty will have dire results. Absent
the development of a long-range plan and more flexible policies, those
living in the Rio Grande basin will eventually "drown in a sea of
197
droughts."
V. THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES
OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES - AN EXEMPLARY
MODERN FRAMEWORK
Legal responses to water scarcity have a solid foundation in the
U.N. Watercourses Convention. 198
[A] right to water.. .could be envisaged as part and parcel
of.. .most fundamentally the right to life... defined carefully,
so as to take into account all-too-prevalent instances of
region-wide water shortages .... [A]n argument emphasizing
harm to humans is more powerful... than one based on

[Flive years before Bowers v. Hardwick (upholding Georgia anti-sodomy
law), the European Court of Human Rights considered a case, which
involved consensual homosexual conduct. The Court held that a Northern
Ireland law that proscribed such conduct was invalid. The ruling was
authoritative in all countries that are members of the Council of Europe
(now numbering 45) and stands in direct opposition to Bowers.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481.
196. Ingram & White, supra note 121, at 153. A Policy Minute would help to build a
consensus among competing interests in supporting a functional expansion of the IBWC.
Yet, a Policy Minute will not eliminate every moment of crisis that is acutely felt at a local
level. There will continue to be battles of dueling satellite imagery showing an abundant
supply of water in reserve in Mexico (U.S. satellite imagery) or depleted reserves (Mexican
satellite imagery), and there will continue to be calls for symbolic blockades and punitive
sanctions. See also Rennie, supra note 89; Lynn Brezosky, Texas, Mexico Quarrel over Water,
ASSOCIATED

PRESS,

May 23, 2002, Financial News (describing truck blockade of

international bridge at Pharr, Texas, and calling for sanctions against Chihuahuan
agricultural products coming into the United States since accusations of hoarding and calls
for restitution continue); Southwest Farm Press, supra note 134.
197. Octavio E. Chavez, The 1994-95 Drought, What Did We Learn from It?: The Mexican
Perspective,39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 35, 45 (1999).
198. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700.
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traditional notions of transboundary harm to an abstraction, namely, a state. 199
This modern international perspective places water conflicts into
a global context with less emphasis upon historical sovereignty. In the
twenty-first century, water will become an increasingly sought-after
resource. As the world population increases and as global patterns of
climatic change become more evident, careful maintenance and conservation of water resources will be crucial.
The current water crisis on the Rio Grande may at first glance
seem a narrowly contained conflict, focused upon allocation dynamics
between the United States and Mexico. However, the ultimate solution of
the crisis will almost certainly involve the IBWC. 2°° The IBWC has
jurisdiction over the physical border region of the Rio Grande and over
structures within this zone. 201 It would take actions by the respective
governments of the United States and Mexico to change the terms of the
Treaty. Treaties are "reinforced by the cumulative record of institutional
practices in their service....,202 Any effort to alter the 1944 Treaty would
require congressional approval in both countries, potentially creating a
"political hornet's nest with no assurances that the current state of affairs
would be improved by the effort." 20 3 The IBWC has exercised its
jurisdiction for over 50 years, calling upon the services of the respective
governments and courts to help facilitate that exercise. 204 In order to
remove the IBWC from playing a key role in future crises, the respective
governments would have to wipe the slate clean of the 50 years of
decisions and precedents concerning this vital natural resource. In an era
of increased economic outreach and public claims of cooperation
between the United States and Mexico 20 5 (i.e., NAFTA206 facilitating trade
between the two countries and current efforts to address illegal
immigration), 2 7 it is unlikely that the two countries would choose to
199. Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International
Implications,5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1, 18-20 (1992).
200. Mumme, supra note 54, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 149, at 156.
201. 1944 Treaty, supra note 4, art. 4.
202. Mumme, supra note 54, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 149, at 156.
203. Mumme, supra note 54, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J.93, at 101.
204. 1944 Treaty, supra note 4, art. 24(c).
205. Concurrent Resolution recognizing the important relationship between the United
States and Mexico, H.R. Con. Res. 206, 107th Cong. (2001). See also Vivienne Bennett &
Lawrence A. Herzog, U.S.-Mexico Borderland Water Conflicts and Institutional Change: A
Commentary, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 973, 986-87 (2000).
206. NAFTA, supra note 59.
207. Norah O'Donnell, Mexico's President Backs Bush, MSNBC News, Jan. 12, 2004,
available at www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3936803 (last visited Mar. 10, 2004). President Fox of
Mexico described President Bush's proposed overhaul of U.S. immigration laws, which
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erase the 50 years of cooperative attempts by the IBWC. The resolution
by the IBWC of the current and future water crises along the Rio Grande
has great potential to provide strong precedent for international
watercourse law. The more completely the solution involves an open,
transparent, participatory methodology, the greater the potential for a
positive international influence. However, if the solution to future Rio
Grande water disputes involves only the rigid adherence to empirical
templates, then the IBWC will lose its credibility as an effective forum for
water dispute resolution within an international context.
The 1944 Treaty does provide the IBWC with a seemingly
limited mandate. However, there is room within that mandate for
adaptation to change. The addition of a comprehensive Policy Minute
would provide flexibility for the IBWC as an international body capable
of broadening its potential sphere of influence and widening its
interpretive vocabulary. The IBWC must incorporate a framework of
modern international law or its legitimacy and credibility will be vastly
reduced in the eyes of the international community.
A. The Convention as a Framework
In 1997, Mexico introduced the Watercourse Convention into
28
The resolution introducing the
deliberation at the United Nations.
Convention was co-sponsored by 33 other states, including the United
States. 2°9 The U.N. General Assembly adopted the final text of the
Convention on May 21, 1997, with a final vote of 103 to 3 (with 27
abstentions). 210 The United States and Mexico both voted for adoption of
the Convention. 211 As of 2003, neither the U.S. nor the Mexican
governments have formally ratified the Convention, but it is generally
agreed that the final outcome was acceptable to both upstream and
would among other provisions give millions of undocumented Mexican workers in the
United States legal status for at least three years. See also Norah O'Donnell, The Warming of
U.S.-Mexico Ties, MSNBC News, Jan. 13, 2004, available at www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/3947169 (last visited Mar. 10, 2004).
208. Patricia Wouters, The Legal Response to Water Scarcity and Water Conflicts: The U.N.
Watercourse Convention and Beyond, n.123, available at www.thewaterpage.com/patwoutersl.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2004) (listing the 33 sponsoring countries and citing UN
Docs. A/51/L.72 and A/51/869); see also Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses
of International Watercourses, G.A. Res. 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Annex, Agenda Item
22 9
.htm
144, at 1 (1997), available at http://www.un.org/ga/documents/gares5l/ga5l(last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
209. Wouters, supra note 208.
210. Convention is annexed to G.A. Res. 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Annex (1997),
229
.htm (last visited Mar. 17,2004).
availableat www.un.org/ga/document/gares5l/ga5211. Id.
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downstream states as a pragmatic middle-of-the-road solution.212 The
Convention has already acquired authoritative stature as an important
213
framework outlining the law of international watercourses.
Although neither the United States nor Mexico is signatory to
the Convention, 214 both countries stated enthusiasm for the Convention
from the outset. The United States actively supported a recommendation
to give overall emphasis to the theme of cooperation to the
Convention. 215 In fact, the United States wanted to expand the obligation
to cooperate (which is embodied in article 8) to serve as an overarching
theme for the rest of the articles of the Convention. 216 Additionally,
during discussions over the Convention's language, the United States
recommended that the articles of the Convention encourage public
involvement. 217 The draft resolution of the Convention included Mexico
among its sponsors, 218 and both the United States and Mexico voted to
approve the resolution. 219 The framework Convention is a forwardlooking guide for interpreting and possibly predicting the actions of
most states with respect to international watercourses; 220 it codifies the
trend in international watercourse law to turn away from absolute

212. Tobias Nussbaum, Report on the Working Group to Elaborate a Convention on
InternationalWatercourses, 6 REV. OF EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L., 1, 50 (1997).
213. Wouters, supra note 208; see also World Commission for Water-commissioned
Green Cross International's National Sovereignty and International Watercourses Report
(referring favorably to U.N. Convention's positive spirit of cooperation and effective
interdependence), Global Water Partnership,Towards Water Security: A Framework for Action,
(2000), available at www.gwpforum.org/Library.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2004). This was
among paper presentations at the 2nd World Water Forum, The Hague, March 17-22, 2000,
cited in Patricia Wouters et al., Commentary: The Legal Response to the World's Water Crisis:
What Legacy from the Hague? What Future in Kyoto?, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 418, 419
(2001). See also Dinara Kemelova & Gennady Zhalkubaev, Water, Conflict, and Regional
Security in Central Asia Revisited, 11 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 479, 482-83 (2003). See also Gilbert M.
Bankobeza et al., International Legal Developments in Review: 2000 Public International Law,
Environmental Law, 35 INT'L L. 659, n.66 (2001).
214. U.N. Treaty Database, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bibl (last
visited Mar. 10, 2004) or, alternatively, at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Intl
Docs/Watercoursestatus.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2004). See also Schwabach, supra note
20, at 263.
215. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Fifth Session, II Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 172, 173, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 [hereinafter ILC 45th Session].
216. Id.
217. Id. at 172.
218. U.N. Press Release, General Assembly Adopts Convention on Law of Nonnavigational Uses of International Watercourses, GA/9248 (1997). Manuel Tello of Mexico
introduced the draft resolution on the draft Convention on May 21, 1997. Id.
219. Nussbaum, supra note 212, at 47.
220. Schwabach, supra note 20, at 279.
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territorial sovereignty and toward the protection of the rights of lower
riparian states and of the environment."'
Given the merits of the Convention and the initial appearance of
support from Mexico and the United States, why have the two nations
not ratified the treaty? The answer is a complex one, rooted in history.
The United States and Mexico have staunchly defended their own
national sovereignty concerns during the last 50 years of water disputes
and are likely to be cautious in their approach to new methodologies.
Also, the United States and Mexico each play the role of both an upper
and lower riparian in the Rio Grande Valley. 222 The United States is the
upper riparian to Mexico in its supply of water to Mexico from the upper
reaches of the Rio Grande and Colorado rivers but it is a lower riparian
in relation to Mexico's distribution of water from the Rio Bravo/Rio
Conchos waters. The Convention, with its principles of "equitable
utilization" and "no significant harm" could very well prove to be a
useful guide to confronting the growing populations, heightened
economic exchange, and prolonged droughts of the Rio Grande region.
A twenty-first century Policy Minute pointing to the pragmatic
forward-looking language of the Convention would be a useful
guidepost for the IBWC's implementation of the 1944 Treaty. The
framework Convention provides effective, modern international
language that could energize the IBWC. The IBWC has the authority to
develop opinions that address the resolution of all disputes along the Rio
Grande boundary. While the respective Governments have 30 days to
object to these opinions, there is latitude for the IBWC to incorporate by
221. Id.
222. The U.N. Convention has at its heart a careful balancing between the principle of
equitable utilization (often associated with upper riparian's use) and the principle of no
significant harm (associated with the effects of upper riparian's use on a lower riparian).
U.N. Convention, supra note 6, art. V, VII, 36 l.L.M. at 705; see infra Part V.A.2. As the
population increases and as agricultural and industrial development with accompanying
environmental effects mushroom along the borderland, both the United States and Mexico
recognize to a heightened degree their common stake in the waters of the Rio Grande.
However, prolonged, unpredictable droughts complicate this era of increased
interdependence. When the U.N. Convention was introduced, out of historical momentum,
the United States may have identified itself primarily as an upper riparian and Mexico
would have identified itself primarily as a lower riparian. Consequently, there may have
been hesitancy to quickly endorse the U.N. Convention's balancing approach.
Additionally, the United States and Mexico may have believed still that the water
allocation formula approach was all that was needed, because the implications of the
drought that began in 1992 did not begin to significantly impact the IBWC allocations until
a few years later. Nevertheless, it is becoming rapidly apparent that the sense of a
"community of interest" in the Rio Grande Border region far outweighs a singular focus on
sovereignty formulae. See also Joachim Blatter & Helen Ingram, States, Markets and Beyond:
Governance of TransboundaryWater Resources, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 439, 452, 472 (2000).
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reference language of the Convention in its opinions. The IBWC is
strategically positioned to demonstrate and to promote the currency of
the Convention to twenty-first century watercourse problems. The U.S.
and Mexican governments would then have the opportunity to revisit
their early support for the draft Convention and evaluate its relevance in
terms of their ongoing transboundary disputes.
The Convention attempts to codify relevant principles of the law
of international watercourses by providing an "analytical framework for
addressing the conflicting water demands of co-riparian nations.""' It
anticipates disputes between co-riparian nations, setting forth a twoprong test to determine when states have a legal entitlement to use
international waters. 224 Under this test, legal entitlements exist where
they are (1) defined by existing or future agreements and (2) entitlement
would be in accordance with reasonable and equitable utilization of the
watercourse. 2 The Convention also addresses a number of key
principles, including the principles of cooperation, 226 reciprocity, 227
equitable utilization, 228 equitable participation, 229 the intergenerational
principle, 230 and "no significant harm." 231 These could be formally
absorbed into the 1944 Treaty through specific incorporation by

223. McCaffrey, supra note 199, at 18.
224. U.N. Convention, supra note 6, arts. 3(2)-(5), 36 I.L.M. at 704-05.
225. Id.
226. Id. Annex I 6; arts. 5(2), 6(2), 8, 36 I.L.M. at 705-07. The principle of cooperation
states a positive duty of each country that shares a natural resource to cooperate in
promoting the development of that resource in a manner to "render the greatest possible
service to the whole human community that it serves." Id. See also MCCAFFREY, supra note
18, at 399.
227. U.N. Convention, supra note 6, Annex I
6, 36 I.L.M. at 716. The principle of
reciprocity states that Country A will recognize the judicial rights and relations of Country
B to the same extent that Country A's rights are recognized in Country B. Id.
228. Id. art. 5(1), 36 I.L.M. at 705. The principle of equitable utilization states that a
country shall use a shared resource in a reasonable manner with a view to attaining
"optimal and sustainable utilizations taking into account the interests of other states
sharing the resource." Id.
229. Id. art. 5(2), 36 I.L.M. at 705. The principle of equitable participation is a correlate of
equitable utilization and states that states sharing a resource "shall participate in the use
and development and protection of a shared resource and cooperate in that development
and protection." Id.
230. Id. Annex I 5, 36 I.L.M. at 716. The inter-generational principle states that those
using a natural resource at a given period in time should utilize the resource taking into
account the needs of future generations that will use and rely upon the resource. Id.
231. Id. art. 7(1), 36 I.L.M. at 706. The principle of no significant harm states an
affirmative duty on the part of states sharing and using a natural resource to prevent
causing significant harm during their use to other states that share the resource. Id.
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reference to the Convention. 232 If no more than this happens, the
Convention will have made an important contribution by strengthening
the rule of law in international relations and by protecting and
233
preserving international watercourses.
It should not be difficult to incorporate the U.N. Convention into
the application of the 1944 Treaty. Article III(1) and (2) state the intention
2
that the Convention be harmonized with existing treaties.3 Indeed, the
United States has already voiced its support for the Convention. In June
1975, in reply to an International Law Commission questionnaire
regarding the appropriate scope of a future Convention on International
Watercourses, the United States emphasized that "an international
watercourse is understood as a system divided between two or more
States but there is hydrographic coherence to this system irrespective of
political borders. Due to this coherence, there exists an interdependence
of legal relevance between the various parts of the watercourse
belonging to different States." 235 The United States continued, "action
taken, or not taken, affecting water in any part of a hydrographic basin
may produce consequences in other parts of the basin without regard to
the conceptual division of the basin into different political entities....,236
The United States stated, in summation, "This causal relationship
demands that the water system be considered in its entirety for the
purpose of attempting to establish international legal rules because it is
only in that manner that a workable set of rights and obligations can be
established .... 237
Mexico, too, has supported the principles enunciated by the U.N.
Convention. In 1994, Alberto Szekely, a member of the International Law

232. Indeed, the U.N. Convention borrows from the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the
Waters of InternationalRivers, 52 INT'L L. ASS'N CONF. REP. 484 (1966) [hereinafter Helsinki
Rules]. Article V of the Helsinki Rules emphasizes that no one factor in the balancing of
factors for reallocation of the use of international waters is more important than another
factor.
233. Stephen C. McCaffrey, The International Law Commission Adopts Draft Articles on
InternationalWatercourses,89 AM. J. INT'L. L. 395, 404 (1995).
234. U.N. Convention, supra note 6, art 3(1), (2), 36 I.L.M. at 704 ("In the absence of an
agreement to the contrary, nothing in the present Convention shall affect the rights or
obligations of a watercourse State arising from agreements in force for it on the date on
which it became a party to the present Convention.... [Plarties to... [existing watercourse]
agreements may, where necessary, consider harmonizing such agreements with the basic
principles of the present Convention.").
235. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its Twenty-eighth Session, II
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, at 160, U.N. Doc. A/31/10 (U.S. reply to Commission questionnaire).
236. Id.
237. Id.
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Commission from Mexico, spoke in favor of the Convention.238 He
pointed to the highly interdependent nature of the populations along the
Rio Grande where actions taken at one place on the river inevitably affect
the total watercourse system. Therefore, during deliberations on the
Convention, comments both from U.S. and Mexican officials expressly
supported the viewpoint that an international watercourse is an
integrated system. Notably, the United States and Mexico both voted in
favor of the Convention in 1997, a year when their own water disputes
were at the forefront of domestic politics. 239
The drafters of the Convention focused on defining international
watercourses as integrated systems. Integration, therefore, is key to the
Convention's definition of an international watercourse. 240 As a means of
facilitating an integrated approach, the Convention's drafters decided to
adapt a flexible format that could effectively appeal to the widest
possible constituency of countries sharing international watercourses.
One of the threshold matters confronted by drafters of the
convention was the decision whether the Convention would be a
"framework convention" or a convention that provided Model Rules.241
A framework format provides general principles that may be
harmonized 242 and "applied and adjusted" 243 to existing agreements and
to the characteristics of a specific shared watercourse. 244 A framework
convention is elastic in nature and can assist watercourse states in
addressing future changes to the watercourse and to social and political
factors.
In contrast, a Model Rules format sets down express markers
that define more narrowly the relationship between watercourse
states. 245 Model Rules do not have the flexibility of a framework and may
238. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its Forty-sixth Session, I Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N at 57, 175, 176 (2004), U.N. Doc A/49/10 [hereinafter ILC 46th Session].
239. U.N. Convention, supra note 6, art. 2(a), 36 I.L.M. at 704. See also Schwabach, supra
note 20, at 263.
240. Stephen C. McCaffrey & Mpazi Sinjela, The 1997 United Nations Convention on
InternationalWatercourses, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 97, 97 (1998). "'Watercourse' means a system of
waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary
whole and normally flowing into a common terminus." U.N. Convention, supra note 6, art.
2(1), 36 I.L.M. at 704. "'Watercourse State' means a State Party to the present Convention in
whose territory part of an international watercourse is situated, or a Party that is a regional
economic integration organization, in the territory of one or more of whose Member States
part of an international watercourse is situated." Id., art. 3, 36 I.L.M. at 704-05.
241. ILC 45th Session, supra note 215, at 180-81.
242. U.N. Convention, supranote 6, art. 3(2), 36 I.L.M. at 704.
243. Id., art. 3(3), 36 I.L.M. at 704.
244. Id.
245. Examples of framework conventions are Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1529 (1987) and United Nations Conference on
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develop into obstacles in the event of changed physical or social
circumstances. The drafters believed that a framework convention would
246
A
be particularly useful because it would be easier to ratify.
convention providing Model Rules, in contrast, would have received
endorsement based upon the strength and depth of each individual
247
The United States
nation's particular commitment to specific rules.
convention as a
a
"framework"
to
draft
decision
fully supported the
that will guide
obligations
and
rights
method of setting forth "general
to their
tailored
watercourse States in developing management practices
circumstances. The emphasis upon cooperation among watercourse
States is particularly salutary.... "248
The framework Convention provides states with general
principles and rules governing non-navigational uses of international
watercourses. These principles could be specifically incorporated by
reference in an IBWC Minute as a summary of twenty-first century
principles. 249
1. Guideposts in the Framework
The 1944 Treaty has spanned two centuries. In order to ensure its
continued vitality, the Treaty needs a clear statement to affirm support
for a network approach 250 and to recognize emerging, modem principles
of international water law. The international law regarding nonnavigational uses of transboundary watercourses currently requires little
more than the application of a rule of limited sovereignty, together with
2
regard for equitable utilization and the duty to do no harm. 51 However,
the Convention does provide a modern guide for interpreting and
predicting the actions of most states with regard to international

Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31
l.L.M. 849 (1992). An example of a Model Rules convention is the Helsinki Rules, supra note
232.
246. ILC 45th Session, supra note 215, at 85.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 172.
249. The framework format and the appeal to guiding principles are key components of
the 2003 U.S. Dept. of the Interior Report, Water 2025: Preventing Crises and Conflict in the
West (setting forth a framework to identify problems and solutions and including "Six
Principles: respect for existing compacts; modernization of infrastructure; enhanced
conservation; collaborative approaches; research; elimination of institutional barriers while
protecting stakeholders"), available at www.doi.gov/water 2025/Water2O25.pdf (last
visited Mar. 10, 2004). See also ILC 45th Session, supra note 215.
250. See supra notes 171, 174, 188, and 189. See also IBWC, MINUTE 307, MINUTE 308,
supra note 119.
251. Schwabach, supra note 20, at 278.
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watercourses 252 and for the further development of international
watercourse law. The Convention is not law and does not create legal
obligations on states that have not ratified it or acceded to it.253
Nevertheless, it does provide a guide for interpreting and possibly
predicting the actions of most states with respect to international
254
watercourses.
While some of the Convention's substantive rules remain
grounded in the mutual limitation of sovereign rights, "perpetuating the
old paradigm with its core rules focusing upon demarcating individual,
separate entitlements," it also allows for process-based approaches that
seek common ground among the states within a watercourse regime. 255
At its heart, the Convention juxtaposes and seeks to balance the principle
of "equitable utilization" with the principle of causing "no significant
256
harm."
The equitable utilization principle, embodied in article 5, is
typically advanced by upper riparian states that might seek to increase
or alter their use of an international watercourse. 257 Lower riparian states
argue that the principle of equitable utilization is limited by the duty to
not cause significant transboundary harm, which is articulated in article
7.258 Attempting to balance these principles, the Convention rejects
attempts to characterize them as irreconcilable. 2 9 The Convention erases
any contradiction between its two main principles, equitable utilization
and no significant harm, and instead develops a normative framework of
cooperation, which in the twenty-first century has greater legitimacy
than rules still tethered to sovereignty. 260
Key articles in the Convention exemplify the modern, flexible
language of international watercourse law that would energize future
IBWC analysis. Article 3(1) states that the Convention does not affect the
rights or obligations of a watercourse state arising from agreements that

252.
253.

Id. at 279.
Id. at 278-79.

254.

Id.

255. Jutta Brunee & Stephen J. Toopes, The Changing Nile Basin Regime, 43 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 105, 151 (2002).
256. U.N. Convention, supra note 6, arts. 5, 7.
257. Id. art. 5.
258. Brunee & Toopes, supra note 255, at 149.
259. Id. at 153. Article 7 states, "where significant harm nevertheless is caused to
another watercourse State, the States whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of
agreement to such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the provisions
of Article 5.. .to mitigate the harm and.. .discuss the question of compensation." U.N.
Convention, supra note 6, art. 7.
260. Brunee & Toopes, supra note 255, at 159.
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may already be in force. 261 Article 3 also provides that, "[niotwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, parties to agreements referred to
in paragraph 1, may where necessary, consider harmonizing such
262
and
agreements with the basic principles of the present Convention"
hereinafter
agreements
more
or
one
into
enter
may
"Watercourse states
referred to as 'watercourse agreements,' which apply and adjust the
and uses of a
provisions of the present Convention to the characteristics
263
thereof."
part
or
watercourse
particular international
Article 3 also encourages state parties to consider harmonizing
264
existing agreements with the basic principles of the Convention.
Scholars observe that a Convention has only a limited ability to change
entrenched behavior, but the language of harmonization will be a
environmental, and political
potential catalyst for nations under social,
265
pressures resulting from scarce resources.
The U.N. Convention's call in article 3 for harmonization could
align nicely with the language of intent in the 1944 Treaty. The first
sentence of the Treaty's Preamble states that the U.S. and Mexican
governments, "animated by the sincere spirit of cordiality and friendly
cooperation which happily governs relations between them[, establish
this Treaty]." 266 Article 2 of the Treaty articulates the intention to avoid
difficulties resulting from physical changes and acknowledges the
267
international dimension of the IBWC. Article 24 addresses procedures
for dispute resolution, discussion, and adjustment of differences, and
application, where proper, of general or special agreements concluded
268
for the settlement of controversies. Last, but not least, article 25 of the
Treaty provides the procedural mechanism269by which the IBWC can
incorporate new material by issuing Minutes.
Some scholars have criticized the Convention's harmonization
language in Article 3. The permissive language of "may harmonize"
suggests to some observers that there is no firm obligation to
harmonize. 270 Furthermore, the same critics point to the "apply and

261. U.N. Convention, supra note 6, art. 3(1).
262. Id. art. 3(2).
263. Id. art. 3(3).
264. McCaffrey & Sinjela, supra note 240, at 98.
265. Nussbaum, supra note 212, at 48.
266. 1944 Treaty, supra note 4, pmbl.
267. Id. art. 2.
268. Id. art. 24.
269. Id. art. 25.
270. Ellen Hey, The Watercourse Convention: To What Extent Does It Provide a Basis for
Regulating Uses of International Watercourses?, 7 REV. OF EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL.
LAW 291, 292 (Nov. 1998); see also Press Release, General Assembly Adopts Convention on
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adjust" language in article 3(3), which arguably allows parties to change
the language of the Convention without adhering to minimum
standards. 271 Nevertheless, it seems just as feasible that the "apply and
adjust" provision allows states to adapt their application of the
Convention to the particularities of their unique watercourse regime.
Working cooperatively to apply the Convention's modem international
principles to the 1944 Treaty would be a constructive means for the
United States and Mexico to energize the Treaty and to give it a proactive, prospective policy dimension.
2. The Framework'sFocal Point: BalancingArticles 5 and 7
A central debate in the protracted deliberations of the
[International Law] Commission [on the Convention] was
whether to give precedence to the doctrine of equitable
utilization with its long established roots in water quantity
allocation or the rule of 'no significant harm' with its
transboundary pollution origins.272
Article 5 of the Convention, which calls for equitable and
reasonable utilization of a watercourse, and article 7, which requires
states to take all appropriate measures to prevent causing of significant
harm, were closely linked throughout the negotiations. 273 During
deliberations, the United States stated that all articles subsequent to
article 5 should be subordinated to the rule of equitable and reasonable
utilization articulated in 5(1).274 In contrast, after the United Nations
adopted the Convention, key participants concluded that the no-harm
rule of article 7 would not automatically override the principle of
equitable utilization if they should come into conflict. 275 The drafters,
Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Comments of Ethiopia
Delegation, GA/9248, U.N. General Assembly Plenary (May 21, 1997).
271. Hey, supra note 270, at 293.
272. Albert E. Utton, Which Rule Should Prevail in International Water Disputes: That of
Reasonableness or That of No Harm, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 635, 635 (1996).
273. McCaffrey & Sinjela, supra note 240, at 100.
274. ILC 45th Session, supra note 215, at 172. Interestingly, in 1982, prior to the
introduction of the U.N. Convention, the U.S. Supreme Court noted the "reciprocal nature"
of the relationship existing between individual states within the United States sharing
transboundary water. The Court rejected giving priority to the place of origin of the waters.
Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 188 (1982). The Colorado v. New Mexico Court stated,
"equitable utilization is a flexible doctrine which calls for the exercise
of an informed
judgment on a consideration of many factors." Id. at 183. Later, in 1995, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995), a case where upper riparian Colorado was
being harmed by lower riparian Kansas's increased water use, affirmed the flexibility of the
principle of equitable utilization.
275. McCaffrey & Sinjela, supra note 240, at 101.
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recognizing the potential tension, were able to change the language
somewhat.276 The duty in article 7 to "exercise due diligence" was
replaced with a duty to "take all appropriate measures." Ultimately, the
Convention does not expressly resolve these ambiguities. It is silent with
2 77
respect to which article will trump the other in the event of a conflict.
Despite these ambiguities, the IBWC should consider
incorporating articles 5 and 7 of the Convention into the conceptual
network of the 1944 Treaty. Doing so would provide quick reference
points for more efficient decision making during times of crisis in the Rio
Grande network. The Convention's articles 5 and 7 eliminate the
278
possibility that one article would be prioritized over the other. Read
together, the articles require that equitable utilization by one
watercourse state be modified by efforts to prevent significant harm to
another state. The Convention, therefore, provides a starting place for
twenty-first century watercourse dispute resolution. This modern
balancing requires that watercourse states "come to the table" realizing
that adjustment and compromise will play a significant role in the
settlement of disputes.
Article 5's equitable utilization principle, in particular, would be
an instructive guiding principle when viewing the Rio Grande river
basin as an integrated network. Because the principle of equitable
utilization de-emphasizes sovereign borders, it would help policy
makers focus on the best use of an asset given the priorities of need
throughout the entire network. A twenty-first century Minute could
emphatically state overarching principles without resorting to formulas
or balance sheets. For example, in periods of "extraordinary drought"
affecting one section of the watercourse network, allocations could be
prioritized on a system-wide basis.
Such dependence upon equitable utilization as a governing
principle must be accompanied by a heightened ability of all parts of the
network to coordinate widespread data. Equitable utilization places high
value on open access to all water storage facilities throughout the Rio
Grande network and a free flow of information throughout the
network's levels. 279 Article 7's principle of no significant harm,
276.
277.

Id. at 100, 102.
Hey, supra note 270, at 294. Professor Hey's criticism betrays preference for a firm

set of obligatory rules (model rules) as opposed to a framework. This criticism loses sight of
the opportunity that the framework Convention presents to states such as the United States
and Mexico that have an existing Treaty and that would almost certainly not adopt a new

set of structured rules without undergoing a period of transition and adjustment.
278. Brunee & Toopes, supra note 255, at 151.
279. Citizen fora would be instrumental in this process as well. Recent U.S. IBWC
Commissioner Carlos M. Ramirez (2001-2003) moved the U.S. section of the IBWC toward

Winter 2004]

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

"

MINUTE"

meanwhile, would be an added refinement upon the network approach,
forcing continual balancing of the system's reserves and deficits in the
context of current conditions. Under this approach, any harm, no matter
how small, would trigger an equitable utilization analysis by the IBWC.
3. Equitable Participation:Article 5(2)
The Convention also calls for equitable participation in addition
to equitable utilization. The principle of equitable participation is
articulated in the second paragraph of article 5, which provides,
"Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and
protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable
manner." 28 0 The affirmative nature of equitable participation is viewed
as a duty to actively protect and develop a watercourse. Equitable
participation is necessary in an international watercourse regime in order
to produce maximum benefits while maintaining an equitable allocation
of uses and also affording protection to the watercourse itself.281 The
concept of equitable participation in international watercourse law
recognizes that some adjustments or accommodations are required in
order to preserve each watercourse state's equality of right.28 2 The
doctrine has received indirect support from the International Court of
Justice. 2 3 Equitable participation requires a proactive contribution from
all parties to a dispute.28 4

greater public participation. "He expanded the number of Citizen Forum Boards from one
to five. These Boards conduct regular public meetings in various border cities to promote
the exchange of information between the U.S. Section of the IBWC and the public, greatly
increasing the visibility of the IBWC." IBWC Salutes Commissioner Ramirez, BOUNDARY
MARKER (U.S. Section of the IBWC, El Paso, Tex.), Winter 2003/2004. Citizen fora would
ideally be extended cross-border, connecting Mexican communities to U.S. communities
along the Rio Grande. The IBWC website identifies a singular characteristic of the Rio
Grande boundary region: it has 15 pairs of sister cities sustained by agricultural
import/export service and tourism and, in recent years, by a growing manufacturing
sector. The "borderlands population was approximately 10.6 million in 1995. The
International Boundary and Water Commission, Its Mission, Organization and Procedures for
Solution of Boundary and Water Problems, at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/html/
about us.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
280. McCaffrey & Sinjela, supra note 240, at 99.
281. ILC 46th Session, supra note 238, at 97.
282. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-FourthSession, II
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 75, U.N. Doc. A/37/10.
283. Id.; see also Judgment in Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 37 I.L.M.
162, 240 (1998) [hereinafter Gabcikovo-NagymarosJudgment].
284. Taylor, supra note 134. See also Water Shortages Cause Problems, LATIN AMERICAN
NEWSLETrERS,

LATIN AMERICA REGIONAL REPORTS:

DIsPuTE, June 4, 2002, at 2 (on file with author).

MEXICO & NAFTA, THE WATER
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B. A Specific Example of the Application of the Framework
Convention to a Modern International Watercourse Dispute
The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) recently had the
opportunity to employ the Convention's framework in a transboundary
water dispute. In 1998, the I.C.J. issued a decision in the Case Concerning
2s5
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project. In its decision, the I.C.J. "creatively
reinterpreted the Convention to emphasize the parties' binding
obligations to make joint management decisions and" as a result "strictly
26
The case involved a dispute between
limited their 'exit options."'
Hungary and then-Czechoslovakia over the construction and the
operation of a system of locks on the Danube River. Emphasizing how
treaties create long-term obligations between parties, the Court noted
that, especially in recent times, international law is built layer-by-layer,
always looking to past experiences, and using an interdisciplinary
approach.
In Gabcikovo, the I.C.J. held that (1) Hungary should not have
suspended its construction of a dam thus interrupting a joint
2 7
(2) Czechoslovakia was
construction project with Czechoslovakia,
wrong to have responded to Hungary's suspension by building a new
2s
project that diverted the Danube's waters onto their property, 8 and (3)
there had been "new peremptory norms of environmental law that had
emerged since the two countries had signed their original Treaty: Treaty
Concerning the Construction and Operation of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
System of Locks in 1977" 289 and that these "new principles should be taken
29°
The
into consideration in any future application of their Treaty."
developing
the
of
application
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case demonstrates an
principles of environmental law, especially the law relating to
291
transboundary watercourses.
The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros court specifically referred to the
Convention as an authoritative statement of the contemporary law of

285. Gabcikovo-NagymarosJudgment, supra note 283.
286. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Sharing Transboundary Resources: International Law &
Optimal Resource Use, 18 CONN. J. INT'L L. 389, 392 (2002) (book review); GabcikovoNagymaros Judgment, supra note 283, at 187-96.
287. Gabcikovo-NagymarosJudgment, supra note 283, at 187 59.
288. Id. at 190 178.
289. Id. at 221. Treaty Concerning the Construction and Operation of the GabcikovoNagymaros System of Locks, Sept. 16, 1977, Hung.-Czech. Rep. 1109, U.N.T.S. 236, 32
I.L.M. 1247 (1993) [hereinafter Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Treaty.
104, 107.
290. Gabcikovo-NagymarosJudgment, supra note 283, at 195-96
291. Id.
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international watercourses. 292 The court then adapted the framework
language of the Convention to the existing Treaty. 293 The I.C.J. first
focused on the continuing obligations of the parties and how those
obligations are by nature always evolving to take into consideration
current standards. 294 Secondly, while upholding the binding nature of
treaties, the court then interpreted and applied a number of other
principles of international watercourse law.295

In particular, the court relied on the key principles of equitable
utilization and of no significant harm from the Convention (articles 5
and 7) and also pointed to the principle requiring ongoing monitoring
and information exchange (article 14).296 The court described the
principle of equitable participation (article 5(2)) as a "cardinal value" in
international water law. 297 The court specifically noted the Convention's
article 20 (which addresses ecological concerns) as having potential
applicability to international watercourse relations. 298
The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros decision demonstrates that the
Convention has established currency as a codification of international
watercourse law at the turn of the twenty-first century and is a useful
reference in international watercourse dispute resolution. The
Convention gathers under its umbrella an updated restatement of longstanding principles and incorporates new concepts that emphasize longterm strategies and interconnectedness. The IBWC, through reference to
the Convention, could directly benefit from this condensed version of the
modern principles of international watercourse law. A twenty-first
292.

Wouters, supra note 208, at 12; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Judgment, supra note 283, at

195-96.
293. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Judgment, supra note 283; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Treaty,
supra note 289.
294. Gabcikovo-NagymarosJudgment, supranote 283, at 200.
295. Id. at 221.
296. Id. at 213-14, 220, 241.
297. Id.
at 241.
298. Id. at 249-53. The court also reviewed a variety of other international watercourse
principles, such as the principles of good faith and cooperation and the principles of
intergenerational equity and contemporaneity. Id. at 213-15. Intergenerational equity was
developed fully by EDITH BROWN WEISS, FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 127 (1989).

Intergenerational equity has evolved from Principle 2 of the Stockholm Declaration, from
the Brundtland Commission Report, and from Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration, as
discussed in Allen L. Springer, International Environmental Law After Rio: The Continuing
Search for Equity, 7 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 115, 121 (1993). The intergenerational equity
principle states that each generation must handle natural resources with an eye to the
needs of and the consequences to future generations. The principle of contemporaneity
provides the standard that addresses the growing, continuing need for awareness of the
risks that mankind faces and that coerce the development of new norms and standards.
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century Minute that referred to the Convention would enrich future
discussions between the United States and Mexico with proactive
language as an alternative to the past practice of using Minutes
reactively to deal with unanticipated and ongoing problems.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a new policy-oriented Minute, the IBWC should focus upon
harmonizing the 1944 Treaty structure and language with the
299
Convention's principles. Specifically, the principles of cooperation and
of equitable and reasonable utilization and no significant harm should be
emphasized equally. The positive effect of restating guiding principles of
international watercourse law would prove strategic in that it would
allow the IBWC to give a new dimension to its international status.
While in the past the IBWC's international status has been
viewed solely through the lens of the U.S. and Mexican sovereign
interests, in 2004 the IBWC's international status necessitates its
participation in a globally integrative decision-making arena. The IBWC
300
This criticism
has been characterized as an institutional dinosaur.
points to the IBWC as an agent of central governments in a time of
301
decentralized solutions. A new Minute will effectively move the IBWC
into the twenty-first century.
The IBWC seems to recognize its need for an updated context for
its decision making. IBWC Minute 304 identified the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission as a valuable forum for gauging public
30 2
needs and demands related to border water management. The IBWC
30 3
has also referred to a "new strategic plan." This "plan" emphasizes a
need to provide environmentally sensitive, timely, and fiscally responsible boundary and water services while addressing issues of sustainable
development. 3°4 While the IBWC's heightened acuity to issues of modern
concern is notable, the organization currently lacks a structural policy
commitment to the integration and balancing of the wide variety of
issues that affect an international watercourse in the twenty-first century.
The historical practice of focusing upon centralized sovereignty looms
dangerously. Yet, that danger must now be placed in a sharpened,
299. The Convention's article 3 encourages harmonization: "Parties to existing watercourse agreements may consider, where necessary, harmonizing such agreements with the
basic principles of the present Convention." (U.N. Convention, supra note 6, art. 3(2)).
300. Mumme, supra note 56.
301. Id.
302. IBWC, MINUTE 304, supra note 119.
303. Mumme, supra note 56, at 7.
304. Id.
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modern perspective. There have been attempts to address this new
variety of emerging concerns by simply mentioning orbital
organizations, such as the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 30 5 the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission, 06 and the
North American Development Bank.3 07 The IBWC should effectively
bridge its tradition with its future by referring to and incorporating the
available modern language of the Convention, thereby adding the
necessary link to connect to a variety of orbital organizations. The
Convention's framework provides scaffolding that can effectively
facilitate the modernization of the IBWC.
In the context of the Rio Grande water crisis in 2003 and 2004,
the United States and Mexico each play roles of both an upstream and a
downstream state within an international watercourse system. Both
countries have existing obligations to provide water to the other.
Conduct in both the United States and Mexico has implications for each
country on the water supply and water quality of both. The physical
integration of the Rio Grande river basin needs to be formally recognized
in the decisions of the IBWC. Through an institutional commitment to
the international language and principles of the Convention, the IBWC
could take a proactive step to problem solving in the future. Referring to
and incorporating the Convention's principles would be consistent with
U.S. and Mexican support for the Convention. The addition of a new
policy-oriented
twenty-first century Minute would exemplify
institutional imagination and would serve as an important example to
the international community.

305. Established through the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (Environmental Side Agreement), Sept. 13, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M.
1480, to address regional environmental concerns.
306. Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environment Cooperation
Commission (BECC) and a North American Development Bank (NADBANK Agreement),
Nov. 16, 1993, U.S.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1545.
307. Id.

